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Abstract: 
Continuous service certification (CSC) involves the consistently gathering and assessing certification-relevant 
information about cloud service operations to validate whether they continue to adhere to certification criteria. 
Previous research has proposed test-based CSC methodologies that directly assess the components of cloud service 
infrastructures. However, test-based certification requires that certification authorities can access the cloud 
infrastructure, which various issues may limit. To address these challenges, cloud service providers need to conduct 
monitoring-based CSC; that is, monitor their cloud service infrastructure to gather certification-relevant data by 
themselves and then provide these data to certification authorities. Nevertheless, we need to better understand how 
to design monitoring systems to enable cloud service providers to perform such monitoring. By taking a design 
science perspective, we derive universal meta-requirements and design guidelines for CSC monitoring systems 
based on findings from five expert focus group interviews with 33 cloud experts and 10 one-to-one interviews with 
cloud customers. With this study, we expand the current knowledge base regarding CSC and monitoring-based CSC. 
Our derived design guidelines contribute to the development of CSC monitoring systems and enable monitoring-
based CSC that overcomes issues of prior test-based approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
Recently, researchers and practitioners have started to investigate how to innovate the process of 
certifying cloud services to address the challenges of an ever-changing cloud service infrastructure and to 
increase the reliability of issued cloud service certifications (e.g., EuroCloud’s StarAudit or CSA’s Security, 
Trust & Assurance Registry). These efforts have generated innovative specifications of architectures, 
processes, and prototypes that enable certification authorities to continually certify cloud services 
(Anisetti, Ardagna, & Damiani, 2015; Lins, Schneider, & Sunyaev, 2018; Stephanow & Fallenbeck, 2015). 
Continuous service certification (CSC) involves consistently gathering and assessing certification-relevant 
information about cloud service operations to validate whether they adhere to ongoing certification criteria. 
CSC represents a disruptive change because it provides cloud customers with ongoing, up-to-date 
feedback about a cloud service’s security and privacy levels compared with conventional certifications that 
assess a cloud service only at a specific point in time. Although the innovative CSC concept has recently 
gained importance, it remains underexplored and has been test-marketed and evaluated only in trials 
(Krotsiani, Spanoudakis, & Kloukinas, 2015; Teigeler, Lins, & Sunyaev, 2018). Certification authorities and 
cloud service providers continue to struggle with implementing CSC processes and systems due to high 
complexity and a challenging interplay between both parties. In particular, certification authorities 
encounter the problem of how to effectively and consistently collect and assess comprehensive, reliable 
information about cloud service operations (Lins et al., 2018; Lins, Teigeler, & Sunyaev, 2016b). 
Prior research has already proposed conceptual architectures and techniques to continuously audit and 
certify cloud service providers that one can categorize as either test-based or monitoring-based CSC (Lins 
et al., 2018; Stephanow, Banse, & Schütte, 2016b). Certification authorities operate test-based 
methodologies and directly access the cloud service infrastructure to examine cloud service components 
and operations (Stephanow & Banse, 2017), such as verifying the integrity of multiple cloud users’ data 
(Wang, Li, & Li, 2014), or to validate whether they adhere to security criteria (Stephanow & 
Khajehmoogahi, 2017). However, certification authorities cannot easily apply test-based certification in 
practice because they need access to the cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers may refuse 
required infrastructure access due to organizational issues (e.g., resistance to integrate untrustworthy 
techniques of certification authorities) and regulatory issues (e.g., data protection laws) (Lins et al., 2018). 
In addition, performing test-based CSC requires certification authorities to configure and adjust applied 
techniques in accordance with the cloud infrastructure and heterogonous data formats. This adaptation is 
challenging in cloud service environments because cloud infrastructures exhibit dynamic characteristics 
(i.e., dynamic reassignment of resources) and feature fast technology lifecycles and ongoing technical 
changes (i.e., due to agile software development), which ultimately limits the extent to which certification 
authorities can apply test-based CSC.  
Monitoring-based CSC strategies provide auspicious means to overcome these challenges. When 
conducting monitoring-based CSC, cloud service providers monitor their cloud service infrastructure to 
collect data by themselves and then provide certification-relevant information to certification authorities 
(Kunz & Stephanow, 2017). Consequently, monitoring-based CSC does not require invasive cloud 
infrastructure access from certification authorities in contrast to test-based CSC. More importantly, unlike 
in test-based CSC scenarios, cloud service providers can independently alter their cloud infrastructure 
while ensuring that they still transmit certification-relevant data to certification authorities. Despite these 
benefits of monitoring-based over test-based CSC, cloud service providers’ providing certification-relevant 
data has one challenging drawback: the risk that they will deliberately manipulate data. Providers may 
euphemize provided data to assure certification criteria adherence; therefore, providers and certification 
authorities must prove that malicious providers do not manipulate monitoring data. Likewise, cloud service 
providers must set up sophisticated CSC monitoring systems that aggregate certification-relevant data 
across implemented monitoring technologies and format certification-relevant data in accordance with 
certification authorities’ needs. Because previous research has mostly focused on achieving and applying 
test-based CSC, we need to better understand how to design such CSC monitoring systems to address 
these challenges and to enable cloud service providers and certification authorities to conduct monitoring-
based CSC. To address this gap, we answer the research question: 
RQ: How should cloud service providers design a CSC monitoring system to enable certification 
authorities to conduct monitoring-based CSC? 
To counteract current the shortcomings in test-based CSC and foster the diffusion and application of CSC, 
we followed Kuechler and Vaishnavi’s (2008) design science approach and derived universal meta-
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requirements and design guidelines for CSC monitoring systems. Because CSC has recently gained 
research importance (Stephanow & Banse, 2017; Teigeler et al., 2018), we applied an explorative and 
inductive research approach. First, we derived meta-requirements that help cloud service providers design  
CSC monitoring systems by conducting comprehensive interviews with cloud service providers, 
certification authorities, consultants, and customers. Second, we reviewed related literature and surveyed 
available monitoring technologies to propose design guidelines that fulfill the derived meta-requirements. 
Our findings reveal that CSC monitoring systems must fulfill various requirements, such as monitoring and 
transmitting information in an aggregated and anonymized manner. To address these requirements, we 
show how cloud service providers should properly design CSC monitoring systems by, for example, 
applying an agent-based system architecture and integrating existing IT infrastructure monitoring systems 
and corresponding plugins. We provide several contributions to practice and research. We identify meta-
requirements for designing a CSC monitoring system based on exhaustive discussions with industry 
experts and, thus, expand the current design knowledge base regarding CSC and monitoring-based CSC. 
Our derived design guidelines contribute to developing CSC monitoring systems and enable monitoring-
based CSC that overcomes the issues that prior test-based approaches experience in highly dynamic 
cloud environments. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide background information on cloud computing, 
CSC, and related work. In Section 3, we describe our design science research approach. In Section 4, we 
outline how we derived the meta-requirements in detail and present our findings. In Section 5, we propose 
design guidelines to fulfill these meta-requirements. In Section 6, we discuss the benefits and challenges 
of monitoring-based CSC, implications, and directions for future research. Finally, in Section 7, we 
conclude the paper. 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing enables organizations to ubiquitously and on demand access a shared pool of 
configurable and rapidly scalable computing resources without significant management effort or 
interaction with the service provider (Mell & Grance, 2011). These computing resources typically involve 
hardware (infrastructure as a service (IaaS)), development platforms (platform as a service (PaaS)), and 
applications (software as a service (SaaS)). Cloud computing entails five essential characteristics: 1) on-
demand self-service access to 2) virtualized, shared, and managed IT resources that are 3) scalable on-
demand, 4) available over a network, and 5) priced on a pay-per-use basis. These characteristics render 
cloud computing an attractive alternative to traditional information technologies for organizations in diverse 
industries (i.e., healthcare (Gao, Thiebes, & Sunyaev, 2018; Thiebes, Kleiber, & Sunyaev, 2017)) while 
challenging contemporary security and privacy risk-assessment approaches (Benlian, Kettinger, Sunyaev, 
& Winkler, 2018; Hentschel, Leyh, & Petznick, 2018). For example, a multi-tenant and virtualized 
approach seems promising from a cloud provider’s perspective in terms of profit but increases the risk of 
co-location attacks due to inappropriate logical and virtual isolation. 
An increasing amount of research and industry reports has focused on identifying and addressing security 
and privacy risks, such as Internet, network, and access security issues and risks regarding non-
compliance with regulatory requirements (refer to Fernandes, Soares, Gomes, Freire, & Inácio (2014) for 
an excellent review of security issues in cloud environments). For example, cloud computing can 
experience software security risks due to software bugs or faults, such as when a cloud provider 
insufficiently isolates cloud users on a virtual machine layer (Fernandes et al., 2014). In addition, 
outsourced data may fall victim to insiders’ and/or outsiders’ tampering (Sood, 2012), and cloud service 
providers must address security issues related to data storage, unreliable computing, availability, 
cryptography, sanitization, malware, and others (Fernandes et al., 2014; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011). 
Consequently, cloud service providers require diverse strategies to prove that they have satisfactorily 
mitigated these risks.  
Cloud service infrastructures and their surrounding environments feature constant change and high 
dynamism due to the various technological, organizational, and environmental conditions, which make it 
challenging for cloud service providers to mitigate cloud service risks. From a technological perspective, a 
cloud service infrastructure exhibits dynamic characteristics, such as high scalability and on-demand 
access, which require a cloud infrastructure that expands dynamically to provide sufficient resources to 
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meet load deviations (Grozev & Buyya, 2014). To guarantee service quality, cloud infrastructures currently 
rely on dynamic resource reassignments and workload transfers through interconnected cloud systems 
from different cloud data centers (i.e., cloud federations, hybrid or multi clouds) (Buyya, Ranjan, & 
Calheiros, 2010; Grozev & Buyya, 2014). Likewise, cloud infrastructures feature fast technology lifecycles 
and ongoing architectural changes due to inherent architectural patterns (i.e., decoupling of systems and 
micro services) and agile software development (Venters & Whitley, 2012; Weinhardt et al., 2009). For 
example, PaaS and IaaS technologies offer an adequate sandbox for cloud developers to quickly 
experiment with alternative options and ideas and to continuously integrate and deploy new software 
(fragments) (Wei & Blake, 2010). Similarly, cloud computing has exploited and spurred increasing 
decoupling and popularized the reuse of third-party services (Benlian et al., 2018; Tan, Fan, Ghoneim, 
Hossain, & Dustdar, 2016). Cloud applications use functions and resources from remote (micro) services 
(e.g., to retrieve geolocation information from Google maps) and, thereby, allow for flexible, recombined 
services. Consequently, substantial changes in the service infrastructure or even in a company’s strategic 
thrust now occur more often in cloud service contexts. 
From an organizational perspective, cloud service providers operate in complex and dynamic ecosystems 
and supply chains that involve various stakeholders with responsibilities that quickly change in regard to, 
for instance, processing customers’ data (Felici, Koulouris, & Pearson, 2013; Hentschel et al., 2018; Ngo, 
Demchenko, & Laat, 2012). Cloud providers might quickly change how they operate business processes 
during their day-to-day operations despite initial process specifications. Cloud computing and IT 
environment changes, such as the emergence of new vulnerabilities, require cloud providers to adapt their 
organizational processes and train their employees accordingly; otherwise, major security incidents or 
harmful vulnerabilities may threaten the cloud service.  
Cloud services also constantly change due to the surrounding environment (Lins, Schneider, Benlian, & 
Sunyaev, 2017; Schneider & Sunyaev, 2016). For example, new market entries, competitive pressures, 
and steady changes in consumers’ preferences require cloud service providers to sense and respond to 
emerging environmental changes quickly and affect providers’ strategies, structures, and day-to-day 
operations (Hentschel et al., 2018; Lee, Sambamurthy, Lim, & Wei, 2015; Schneider, Wollersheim, 
Krcmar, & Sunyaev, 2018). In addition, cloud services have highly dynamic legal and regulatory 
landscapes (Lins, Grochol, Schneider, & Sunyaev, 2016a). Governments continually adjust existing laws 
and propose new ones to address the challenges resulting from society’s digital transformation and IT 
growth. For example, the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) focuses on giving control back 
to citizens and residents over their personal data and, thus, imposes new requirements on cloud service 
operations and demands that cloud service providers adjust their cloud infrastructure and organizational 
processes.  
These technological, organizational, and environmental changes pose major challenges for cloud service 
providers in ensuring their services’ ongoing security and privacy and call for innovative strategies to 
prove and communicate ongoing, adequate risk prevention for cloud customers. 
2.2 Continuous Certification of Cloud Services 
A common strategy (and a particularly important one for small- and medium-sized cloud service providers) 
to reduce customers’ security, privacy, and reliability uncertainty and to signal trustworthiness and 
adequate risk prevention involves acquiring certifications (Khan & Malluhi, 2013; Lins & Sunyaev, 2017; 
Sunyaev & Schneider, 2013). A certification refers to a third-party’s verification that products, processes, 
systems, or persons conform to specified criteria (International Organization for Standardization, 2004). 
During a certification process, certification authorities employ provider-independent and accredited 
auditors to perform comprehensive, manual checks to assess adherence according to a defined set of 
certification criteria (Lansing, Benlian, & Sunyaev, 2018)1. If a provider adheres to specified criteria, then a 
certification authority awards a formal written certificate and providers can embed a graphical Web 
assurance seal on their websites. Cloud service certifications typically focus on ensuring cloud services’ 
availability, integrity, and confidentiality for a one- to three-year validity period (Lins et al., 2018; 
Schneider, Lansing, Gao, & Sunyaev, 2014).  
                                                     
1  In this study, we focus on certification authorities who collect and analyze certification-relevant data for clarity. However, 
certification authorities typically employ (independent) auditors to perform certification-relevant activities (i.e., data collection and 
analysis) in practice. Therefore, auditors may actively participate in the CSC process. 
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However, existing cloud service certifications represent only a retrospective view about whether cloud 
providers fulfill technical and organizational measures when the certification authorities issue the 
certifications (Lins et al., 2016a; Schneider et al., 2014). Typically, certification authorities evaluate 
adherence to certification criteria during a comprehensive certification audit that they perform once. 
Throughout the one- to three-year validity period, certification authorities may not detect certification 
deviations or breaches until long after their occurrence because they validate certification adherence via 
sport checks only during annual surveillance audits. Thereafter, conventional certifications cannot support 
dynamic changes in cloud infrastructures’ structure, deployment, or configuration, such as when data and 
software dynamically migrate across different computational nodes in cloud federations (Krotsiani et al., 
2015). In addition, a cloud service provider may deliberately stop adhering to security and privacy 
requirements to achieve benefits (e.g., reducing required incident response staff to save costs) (Lins et al., 
2017, 2018). Considering the highly dynamic cloud infrastructure that results from the aforementioned 
technological, organizational, and environmental changes, long validity periods may cause cloud 
customers to question certifications’ reliability and trustworthiness and, ultimately, threaten cloud 
certification’s ability to prove adequately prevent risk.  
To address the juxtaposition of static certifications in a dynamic cloud service environment, researchers 
have started to investigate how to innovate the process of certifying cloud services (Windhorst & Sunyaev, 
2013). These research efforts have resulted in innovative architectural and processual specifications and 
processes and CSC prototypes that allow certification authorities to continuously certify cloud services. A 
CSC monitoring system includes automated monitoring and auditing techniques and mechanisms to 
transparently provide certification-relevant information to continuously monitor whether cloud services 
adhere to certification criteria (Lins et al., 2016a). The process to do so includes four major dimensions: 1) 
collecting and transmitting data in a (semi-)automated manner, 2) analyzing data in a (semi-)automated 
manner, 3) presenting up-to-date certification information, and 4) adjusting processes (see Figure 1 and 
Lins et al., 2016a).  
 
Figure 1. Continuous Certification Process (Adapted from Lins et al., 2016a) 
In contrast to annual surveillance audits of conventional certifications, by collecting and analyzing 
certification-relevant data in a (semi-)automated manner, certification authorities can actively detect and 
investigate critical defects as they occur, immediately react to changes or events concerning a cloud 
service, and adjust their certification reports based on continuously assessing these defects, changes, 
and events. By continuously detecting and assuring that cloud providers actually adhere to certifications  
in highly dynamic cloud service environments, CSC can improve consumers’ trust in the certifications that 
certification authorities issue. In cases when environmental threats emerge (i.e., new software 
vulnerabilities) or the regulatory landscape changes (i.e., the E.U. GDPR), certification authorities that 
Data collection & transmission
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and transmit monitoring data
Certification authorities
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external auditing of services
Certification authorities
analyze provided and
gathered data in regard to  
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Providers inform about major (architectural) 
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perform CSC can adjust their auditing scope by, for example, checking whether a cloud provider adheres 
to new certification criteria, whereas they can conventionally only change the certification’s scope after the 
validity period has ended. Likewise, cloud providers and certification authorities can adjust their CSC-
monitoring and -auditing processes to cope with architectural changes to cloud services, such as new 
hardware components or service functionalities. Consequently, in contrast to conventional certification, 
CSC considers the actual status quo of the cloud infrastructure when assessing whether cloud service 
providers adhere to certifications and, ultimately, informs cloud customers on both infrastructure 
improvements (i.e., better service quality) or failures (i.e., data losses) through a transparent and up-to-
date certification representation. 
Because CSC represents a promising strategy to address the challenges in conventional certification in 
dynamic cloud service contexts, an increasing amount of research has focused on analyzing how to certify 
cloud services on an ongoing and automated basis, which emphasizes the need for interminably secure 
and reliable cloud services. In particular, research on CSC analyzes the need and reasons for CSC (Lins 
et al., 2016a; Stephanow & Gall, 2015), examines the theoretical rationale underlying CSC to understand 
it (Lins et al., 2017), and discusses factors that influence stakeholders to participate in CSC (Lins et al., 
2016b; Quinting, Lins, Szefer, & Sunyaev, 2017; Teigeler et al., 2018). More importantly, related research 
discusses how to perform CSC, which we discuss in Section 2.3 in detail. 
2.3 Related Research on How to Perform Continuous Certification 
As Table 1 summarizes, prior research has mainly focused on developing conceptual CSC architectures 
and processes and, more importantly, on analyzing two distinct but complementary types of CSC: test-
based CSC and monitoring-based CSC (Anisetti, Ardagna, Damiani, & Gaudenzi, 2017; Kunz 
& Stephanow, 2017; Lins et al., 2018; Stephanow et al., 2016b). 
Table 1. Overview on How to Perform Continuous Certification 
Literature stream Description Example sources 
Architectures and 
processes 
Conceptual architectures and processes 
depicting how to perform CSC. 
Anisetti et al. (2017), Krotsiani et al. (2015), Kunz 
& Stephanow (2017), Lins et al. (2018), Stephanow 
et al. (2016b) 
Test-based CSC 
Certification authorities access the cloud 
service infrastructure and test cloud 
service components directly. 
Anisetti et al. (2017), Ardagna et al. (2018), 
Katopodis, Spanoudakis, & Mahbub (2014), Lins, 
Thiebes, Schneider, & Sunyaev (2015), Stephanow 
& Banse (2017), Stephanow, Srivastava, & Schütte 
(2016a) 
Monitoring-based 
CSC 
Cloud service providers monitor their 
service infrastructure to collect and provide 
certification-relevant information to 
certification authorities. 
Krotsiani et al. (2015), Krotsiani (2016), Stephanow 
& Fallenbeck (2015) 
 
This study 
Certification authorities operate test-based CSC methodologies to collect certification-relevant information 
by directly accessing the cloud service infrastructure and testing cloud service components (Stephanow 
& Banse, 2017). Typically, test-based certification techniques produce evidence by controlling some input to 
the cloud service and evaluating the output, such as calling a cloud service’s RESTful API and comparing 
responses with expected results (Kunz & Stephanow, 2017). Prior research has shown that certification 
authorities can apply test-based CSC to verify the integrity of multiple cloud users’ data (Wang, Li, & Li, 
2014), assess data location (Doelitzscher et al., 2012a), validate adherence to security criteria 
(Stephanow & Khajehmoogahi, 2017), and so on.  
In contrast, monitoring-based certification techniques use monitoring data as evidence collected from 
service-delivery components when they execute the cloud service  (Kunz & Stephanow, 2017). 
Implementing a CSC monitoring system enables cloud service providers to (continuously) monitor their 
cloud infrastructures and collect and then transmit certification-relevant information to certification 
authorities (Lins et al., 2018). For example, researchers developed a prototypical monitoring-based CSC 
infrastructure (called “CUMULUS”) to, for instance, verify database user identification to validate 
certification criteria (Krotsiani et al., 2015; Krotsiani, 2016). Likewise, prior research has shown that 
certification authorities can use various monitoring metrics and key performance indicators (e.g., 
availability and resource management indicators and hypervisor security metrics) for monitoring-based 
CSC purposes (Stephanow & Fallenbeck, 2015). 
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While test- and monitoring-based CSC methodologies complement each other because certification 
authorities can use them in parallel to collect diverse evidence about certification adherence, both CSC 
methodologies have advantages and disadvantages. First, certification authorities produce evidence in 
test-based CSC via independent tests, whereas monitoring-based CSC bears the risk that cloud service 
providers may manipulate data to assure certification criteria adherence (Stephanow & Banse, 2017). 
Second, in contrast to monitoring-based CSC, test-based methodologies are invasive because they require 
access to the cloud service components in contrast to monitoring-based CSC (Kunz & Stephanow, 2017). 
Technical limitations and barriers may hinder certification authorities from collecting necessary information 
in test-based CSC (e.g., because integrating additional auditing systems and accessing software 
interfaces require extensive modifications to cloud systems, which can be quite expensive to implement) 
(Lins et al., 2018). More importantly, most service providers do not want and have no obligation to 
integrate certification authorities’ test-based techniques into their systems. Indeed, some providers may 
even resist doing so. Third, efficiently collecting test-based data requires extensive knowledge about 
organizational processes, structures, and cloud service architecture unlike monitoring-based CSC. 
However, certification authorities have limited knowledge about specific cloud infrastructures and 
processes since they operate independently from providers (Lins et al., 2018). Finally, performing test-
based CSC requires certification authorities to configure and adjust applied testing techniques in 
accordance with the individual cloud infrastructure and respective heterogonous data formats. Thus, in 
cases of highly dynamic cloud service infrastructures, certification authorities need to adjust applied test-
based methodologies constantly, which ultimately leads to high operation costs and expenditures and 
limits their ability to practically apply test-based CSC. In contrast, when performing monitoring-based 
CSC, cloud service providers can independently alter their cloud infrastructure when ensuring that they 
transmit certification-relevant data to certification authorities according to their needs.  
Despite the benefits associated with monitoring-based CSC, previous research has mostly focused on 
achieving and applying test-based CSC (see Table 1). While prior research has proven the feasibility of 
monitoring-based CSC by developing a prototype (Krotsiani et al., 2015; Krotsiani, 2016) and provided 
recommendations for items to monitor (Stephanow & Fallenbeck, 2015), we need to more deeply 
understand how to design CSC monitoring systems to address the risk of data manipulation and the 
challenging interplay between certification authorities and cloud service providers. To address this 
research gap, we apply a design science research approach and derive meta-requirements and design 
guidelines for CSC monitoring systems. 
3 Research Approach 
3.1 Design Science Research 
Design science research involves both creating new knowledge via designing novel IT artifacts and 
evaluating how one use them or how the artifacts perform. It also involves reflection and abstraction to 
improve and understand how the artifacts behave (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004; Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2015). In the design-creation process, one conducts a sequence of activities to produce 
“something new”—a novel IT artifact. In the evaluation process, the created IT artifact undergoes an 
evaluation to produce feedback and generate new knowledge about the problem (Beck, Weber, & 
Gregory, 2013). Design science offers a rigorous and meaningful contribution to practice and theory in the 
form of the design knowledge, an IT artifact, and its evaluation. 
We currently lack a comprehensive (theoretical) understanding about how to design CSC monitoring 
systems to perform monitoring-based CSC because the innovative idea of continuous cloud service 
certification has recently gained research importance and remains underexplored, test marketed, and 
evaluated only in trials (Stephanow & Fallenbeck, 2015; Teigeler et al., 2018). We address this lack of 
design knowledge by following Kuechler and Vaishnavi’s (2008) design science approach and deriving 
universal requirements and design guidelines for designing CSC monitoring systems (refer to Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Design Research Cycle (Adapted from Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008)2 
According to Kuechler and Vaishnavi’s (2008) model, design science research starts with problem 
awareness, which an initial proposal that depicts a problem that one has to solve reflects. The next phase, 
the suggestion phase, tests whether one can convert the formulated proposal into a tentative design. One 
subsequently develops and evaluates the IT artifact and draws conclusions from it due to the problem-
solving process.  
In this study, we focus on the first two phases: problem awareness and suggestion. One needs to 
understand the problem to design a satisfactory IT artifact (Amrou & Böhmann, 2016; Beck et al., 2013). 
Thereafter, in design science research, one needs to derive well-defined requirements and design 
guidelines; they ensure an IT artifact’s relevance to a real-world problem and provide the basis for 
creating and evaluating it (Amrou & Böhmann, 2016; Beck et al., 2013; Hevner et al., 2004; Pries-Heje & 
Baskerville, 2008; Walls, Widmeyer, & Sawy, 1992). Without clearly defined requirements, the IT artifact 
will not be useful and cannot offer a satisfying solution (Albert, Goes, & Gupta, 2004; Beck et al., 2013; 
Markus, Majchrzak, & Gasser, 2002). Based on this study’s findings, future research can develop and 
evaluate a monitoring technology to perform continuous cloud service certification to complete the design 
cycle. 
3.2 Data Collection 
We applied an explorative and inductive design science approach as Beck, Weber, and Gregory (2013) 
and Kuechler, Park, and Vaishnavi (2009) suggest to collect the necessary data to derive rich meta-
requirements and design guidelines for the monitoring-based CSC phenomenon. We complement and 
specify this design science approach with grounded theory techniques, such as theoretical sampling and a 
constant comparative technique (Beck et al., 2013; Kuechler et al., 2009). More specifically, we applied 
techniques of the “Straussian” version of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2015) because this version 
provides unambiguous process guidance and IS research widely adopts it (Urquhart, Lehmann, & Myers, 
2010; Wiesche, Jurisch, Yetton, & Krcmar, 2017). We applied an inductive approach so we could 
investigate complex circumstances that the literature has not yet explored (Kuechler et al., 2009). In 
addition, research has shown grounded theory approaches to be useful when addressing new or poorly 
understood phenomena (Smolander, Rossi, & Purao, 2008), to allow theoretical concepts that have close 
ties to the phenomena under observation to emerge, and to allow one to consider the contexts that embed 
those phenomena (Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2005).  
Theoretical sampling guided the data-collection process; that is, the concepts that emerged from data 
analysis greatly influenced the respondents we chose and the questions we posed (Abraham, Boudreau, 
Junglas, & Watson, 2013; Corbin & Strauss, 2015). Thus, insights that we gained from initially collecting 
and analyzing data guided how we subsequently collected and analyzed data. Theoretical sampling 
                                                     
2 Note: dashed outline summarizes this study’s outputs. 
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enables researchers to discover the concepts in terms of their properties and dimensions that pertain to a 
problem and to uncover variations and identify relationships between concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). 
To collect data to better understand the problem domain and derive meta-requirements and design 
guidelines, we conducted five focus group interviews with certification authorities, cloud service providers, 
and consultants and ten one-to-one interviews with cloud customers (refer to Table 2). Because we used 
an inductive approach, we did not select theories to test or incorporate prior to collecting and analyzing 
data (Abraham et al., 2013). 
Table 2. Summary of Conducted Interviews 
No. Interview type Focus Participants Sampling reason 
1 Focus group 
Objectives and scope of 
CSC 
Four cloud service providers 
One cloud service consultant 
Starting point 
2 Focus group 
How to collect and 
provide information 
Four cloud service providers 
Four certification authorities 
Two cloud service consultants 
Include certification authority 
representatives 
3 Focus group 
How to collect and 
provide information 
Six cloud service providers 
Seven certification authorities 
Two cloud service consultants 
Joint discussion between providers 
and authority representatives 
4 
One-to-one 
interviews 
Identify customer 
requirements 
Ten cloud service customers Consider customer perspective 
5 Focus group 
Implementing monitoring-
based CSC 
Six cloud service providers 
Validate applicability from provider 
perspective 
6 Focus group 
Using monitoring results 
in certification processes 
Five certification authorities 
Validate applicability from 
certification authority perspective 
By conducting focus group interviews, one can collect viewpoints about a certain defined topic of interest 
from a group of people who have certain experiences (Myers, 2013). Focus groups also enable 
participants to engage in thoughtful discussions and generate practical and extensive data. We conducted 
the first focus group interview in November, 2014, with four cloud service providers and one cloud service 
consultant. In this first interview, we discussed the objectives and scope of performing monitoring-based 
CSC. However, discussions and data analyses revealed that we needed to more deeply understand 
certification authorities’ needs and perspectives on monitoring-based CSC. Therefore, we invited 
representatives of certification authorities to join the discussions in the second and third focus group 
interviews, which we held in December, 2014, and April, 2015. Subsequent data analyses revealed that 
monitoring-based CSC may also affect cloud customers to a certain degree (e.g., certification authorities 
may analyze customers’ data during certification processes). Thus, we conducted 10 semi-structured 
interviews with cloud service customers between June and July, 2015, to identify requirements that 
customers imposed on performing monitoring-based CSC. Finally, we conducted a focus group interview 
in January, 2017, with six cloud service providers first and then with five certification authority 
representatives to discuss our data analysis findings and open issues and reach theoretical saturation.  
During these interviews, the participants actively discussed the CSC concept and reflected their individual 
use cases. In total, 16 cloud service providers, 12 certification authority representatives, five cloud service 
consultants, and 10 cloud service customers participated (refer to Appendix A for information on the 
interviewees). The cloud service providers operated on national and global scales to provide 
infrastructure, platform, and software cloud services. The size of each provider ranged from medium- to 
large-sized enterprises. The certification authority representatives had years of experience in cloud 
services, infrastructure, data security, and protection certification audits. Large certification or auditing 
organizations employed them or they worked as independent auditors. The participating consultants 
advised providers about their decision to obtain certification. The cloud customers, all IT managers, came 
from medium- to large-sized enterprises and different sectors, including IT, health, and finance. The 
practitioners who participated in our interviews had not adopted CSC but expressed interest in or 
advocated for it. We distributed the interview partners to gain as much insight as possible and triangulate 
data from different perspectives (i.e., certification authorities and cloud service providers) as previous 
work recommends (Patton, 2015). This highly diverse group of practitioners helped us understand the 
problem domain and establish various meta-requirements to design CSC monitoring systems. Each focus 
group interview lasted four hours on average. Each customer interview lasted 53 minutes on average. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 469 
 
Volume 44  10.17705/1CAIS.04425 Paper 25 
 
We conducted each interview, which we recorded, based on an interview guide (Yin, 2014). The interview 
guide kept the interactions focused while allowing individual experiences to emerge during the limited 
interview period (Gorden, 1980). Therefore, the interview guide served as a reminder of the information 
that we needed to collect (Yin, 2014). After each interview, we adapted the interview guide if new 
concepts emerged and to validate prior findings following the theoretical-sampling process. We asked 
interview partners questions about potential CSC use cases, CSC’s scope, potential architectures and 
processes to provide certification-relevant information, and CSC’s risks and limitations (refer to Appendix 
B for example interview questions). Although we have conducted research regarding CSC for several 
years, we applied a nonjudgmental form of listening (Walsham, 1995), maintained distance (Patton, 
2015), and strived to maintain an open and non-directive style of conversation during the interviews to 
ensure impartiality as required when applying grounded theory techniques to avoid bias in theory 
development (Heath, 2006). Finally, we followed established methodological guidelines to collect and 
analyze data (see Appendix C for summary).  
3.3 Design Creation and Evaluation 
Building on our iterative data-collection and theoretical-sampling approach, we analyzed the initial data we 
collected in 2014 to derive meta-requirements (see Section 4.1 for details on how we analyzed the data to 
derive meta-requirements and Section 5.1 for design guidelines, respectively). We then used the 
sequenced interviews to constantly evaluate our derived meta-requirements and design guidelines. 
Therefore, our design science process occurred in multiple iterations of meta-requirement and design 
guideline derivation and refinement to generate a design that fully satisfies the researchers and 
practitioners who subsequently use it (Beck et al., 2013; Hevner et al., 2004). Thus, the entire design 
process involves much repetition since, in each step, we repeated and improved on previous steps (as 
Figure 3 depicts).  
Specifically, we analyzed the data that we collected in the first and second focus group interviews in 2014 
to derive an initial set of meta-requirements and corresponding design guidelines, which resulted in 13 
meta-requirements and 15 design guidelines. To evaluate our initial findings, we presented and discussed 
this set with practitioners during the third focus group interview in 2015. Then, we refined the meta-
requirements and design guidelines accordingly and also identified one additional meta-requirement and 
design guideline. As a second evaluation, we then validated these results during the one-to-one interviews 
with cloud customers in 2015 based on which we further refined our previous findings. Finally, in the last 
evaluation phase, we discussed the derived design concepts of CSC monitoring systems and jointly 
assessed their suitability and appropriateness when continuously assessing whether cloud service 
operations adhere to certification criteria adherence during both focus groups in 2017. Appendix D 
summarizes how we derived and refined the meta-requirements and design guidelines. 
 
Figure 3. Evaluation Process of the Meta-requirements and Design Guidelines 
4 Problem Awareness Phase: Deriving Meta-requirements 
4.1 Research Steps to Derive Meta-requirements 
As we state in Section 3.1, design science research starts with problem awareness, which an initial 
proposal that depicts a problem that one has to solve reflects (Beck et al., 2013; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 
2008). Although the innovative idea of continuous cloud service certification has recently gained research 
awareness, the majority of research has focused on developing test-based CSC methodologies, and we 
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lack comprehensive design knowledge about how to perform monitoring-based CSC. To better 
understand different stakeholders’ needs (i.e., cloud service providers and certification authorities) and the 
issues related to performing monitoring-based CSC, we derived and constantly refined meta-requirements 
that can help cloud service providers design CSC monitoring systems. Meta-requirements define what an 
IT artifact is for and typically describe its goals, scope, and boundaries (Gregor & Jones, 2007). Thus, 
identifying meta-requirements helps one to understand how to design and implement CSC monitoring 
systems and determine the challenges that design guidelines need to meet in the suggestion phase. 
Meta-requirements do not refer to the requirements for one instance of an IT artifact (i.e., a specific CSC 
monitoring system) as would be the case if industry needed to build a single system. Instead, design 
science research focuses on deriving requirements that pertain to a whole class of IT artifacts. 
Consequently, meta-requirements provide insights and knowledge for upcoming design science research 
projects.  
Following the concept of theoretical sampling, we began analyzing data to derive meta-requirements after 
we collected our first data in 2014 during the focus group with cloud service providers (Corbin & Strauss, 
2015). We used the coding paradigm typical of the “Straussian” version of grounded theory to analyze our 
data (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Wiesche et al., 2017). Accordingly, in analyzing the data, we conducted 
open, axial, and selective coding (with each type at a higher, more abstract data-analysis level than the 
preceding one) (Abraham et al., 2013; Corbin & Strauss, 2015). Coding refers to a process in which one 
annotates and labels interview transcripts with a piece of text (Jones & Hughes, 2001). To determine the 
labels, we used words that the interviews suggested (Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007). We used Atlas.ti 7, 
a tool that helps one code qualitative data, to facilitate this process. 
4.1.1 Open Coding 
Open coding entails fracturing the data by describing concepts in it that may define a significant 
occurrence or incident about a phenomenon (Abraham et al., 2013; Corbin & Strauss, 2015). Through this 
type of coding, we created 94 codes related to 438 textual segments that we obtained from the 15 
interviews. As an example of a coded textual segment, we highlighted a portion of a customer interview 
(i.e., “For me, it is obvious that no customer data are checked”) and coded it as “data protection during 
monitoring”. 
4.1.2 Axial Coding 
Axial coding involves coding for causes, actions-interactions, and consequences (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; 
Strong & Volkoff, 2010). Causes answer questions about why, when, and how come and, thus, refer to the 
perceived reasons that persons give for why things happen. Action-interaction refers to the actual 
responses people or groups make to the events or problematic situations that occur. Consequences refer 
to anticipated or actual outcomes of action and interaction. Thus, with axial coding, we could understand 
what requirements stakeholders impose when designing CSC monitoring systems, why they do so, and 
the consequences when stakeholders do or do not adhere to these requirements. Through axial coding, 
we created 23 codes that relate to text segments that describe causes for requirements and 13 codes that 
correspond to text segments that depict consequences from (not) adhering to requirements, while the 
majority of previous open codes relate to actions-interactions. After understanding causes, actions, and 
consequences, axial coding enables one to compare codes to classify them under common themes and, 
thus, create hierarchical classifications (Abraham et al., 2013; Corbin & Strauss, 2015). For example, we 
combined the code “availability criterion” and “access management criterion” to form the theme “security 
criteria”. Later on, we grouped the themes “security criteria” and “organizational criteria” as “certification 
criteria” to classify data into larger categories. By comparing codes, we created 14 categories on the 
highest level that form our meta-requirements and that we present in the Section 4.2.  
4.1.3 Selective Coding 
During selective coding, we integrated all findings into one “core category”; that is, we formulated a story 
line that coherent conceptualized the main phenomenon. By doing so, we could move beyond description 
to a more abstract conceptualization level (Urquhart et al., 2010). We turned to the literature to identify a 
suitable core category. Because we focused on designing CSC monitoring systems, we relied on system 
architectural patterns to structure our meta-requirements. Architectural patterns capture the essence of an 
architecture that different software systems have used (Sommerville, 2012). Traditional monitoring system 
architectures use a layered client-server architectural pattern (refer to Figure 4) (Fatema, Emeakaroha, 
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Healy, Morrison, & Lynn, 2014). The layered architecture pattern organizes the system into layers with 
related functionality associated with each layer (Sommerville, 2012). 
 
Figure 4. Traditional Monitoring System Architecture (Adapted from Fatema et al., 2014) 
The clients refer to cloud hardware and software components (i.e., storage servers and virtual machines). 
Monitoring agents are deployed from a monitoring server on these components to collect relevant 
monitoring data. The monitoring server typically embeds application, data, and interface layers. On the 
application layer, the monitoring system manages agent deployment, analyzes the collected data and 
metrics, and stores the results in a database on the database layer. On the interface layer of a monitoring 
system, a Web frontend displays the stored data or provides administrators with the means to generate 
graphs or service level agreements reports.  
In comparing our interview findings with the layered client-server architectural pattern from the literature, 
we found a means to organize our results in a conceptually meaningful way. Thus, we assigned our 
derived meta-requirements to related architectural layers. In addition, we identified non-functional 
requirements that serve as constraints on the system’s design across the different layers. A non-functional 
requirement refers to a requirement that specifies criteria that one can use to judge how a system 
operates rather than specific behaviors (Sommerville, 2012). 
To guide our data-analysis approach, we applied constant comparison (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Wiesche 
et al., 2017). Constant comparison focuses on assessing whether the data support and continue to 
support emerging categories (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Thus, we compared any unit of data with another 
unit to ensure that we grounded the discovery in rigorous coding and systematic procedures. First, we 
constantly compared who said what because we interviewed practitioners from different domains, 
including cloud service providers, certification authorities and cloud customers. Furthermore, we 
compared the individual statements that relate to a certain category to identify their properties and 
dimensions. For instance, one meta-requirement demands that CSC monitoring systems need to 
aggregate monitoring data. While comparing statements on data aggregation, we identified several 
aggregation dimensions, including aggregating data across monitoring systems, plugins and tools, and 
cloud data centers. More importantly, we compared findings from each interview with subsequent 
interviews to triangulate our data. For example, cloud service providers reported that they would integrate 
third-party hardware to enable CSC during the first focus group interview. However, interviewees in the 
second and third focus groups expressed resistance due to high security concerns when integrating third-
party hardware. We compared the corresponding statements to understand the reasons for and 
consequences of the contrasting opinions and, thus, deepened our understanding. Appendix D 
summarizes the emergence of meta-requirements, causes, and consequences and how we iteratively 
refined meta-requirements throughout our research approach given the iterative nature in which we 
collected data and applied constant comparison. 
Finally, we applied memoing; that is, a technique that one can use to note theoretical ideas during data 
analysis and communicate insights from the data analysis (Gasson & Waters, 2013). Memoing ensures 
that one does not forget or leave underdeveloped novel insights triggered during the long process of 
collecting and analyzing the data (Wiesche et al., 2017). We opted for a relatively fluid memoing scheme 
(Abraham et al., 2013) and noted insights that emerged while we coded data. For example, we took notes 
while assessing data-aggregation statements because it became apparent that we should conduct data 
aggregation from a service perspective. 
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4.2 Meta-Requirements for Continuous Service Certification Monitoring Systems 
In this section, we present meta-requirements for designing CSC monitoring systems. Table 3 
summarizes the elicited requirements. While we present the meta-requirements in isolation, they depend 
on and might even complement one another. For example, achieving a high degree of monitoring 
automation (relating to REQ-NF1) facilitates traceability of operations (relating to REQ-NF3) because a 
CSC monitoring system can easily record the execution of automated operations in log files. 
Table 3. Elicited Meta-requirements 
Req-ID Requirement Description 
Data-gathering layer (client) 
DGL1 
Gather relevant data for cloud 
service certifications 
Gather evidence about data availability, confidentiality, integrity, and so 
on. 
DGL2 
Gather data by relying on existing 
monitoring technologies 
Leverage existing monitoring technologies to gather relevant data. 
DGL3 
Consider monitoring the cloud 
supply chain 
Evaluate whether providers can gather additional information about their 
subproviders’ performance. 
DGL4 
Ensure data confidentiality during 
data collection 
Determine which monitoring data the certification authorities require and 
whether collecting these data causes a conflict with any privacy, legal, or 
company regulations. 
Application layer (server) 
AL1 Enable data aggregation 
Aggregate low-level monitoring data of individual resources to construct 
meaningful and significant status indicators of respective cloud services. 
AL2 Ensure data protection 
Ensure protection of monitoring data to prevent leakage of sensitive or 
security-relevant information. 
AL3 Enable data filtering Filter monitoring data according to authorities’ needs. 
Data layer (server) 
DL1 Enable data archiving Archive collected and processed monitoring data for certain periods. 
DL2 Ensure data integrity Prevent manipulation of monitoring data. 
Interface layer (server) 
IL1 Provide certification-relevant data 
Enable flawless and continuous data exchange with certification 
authorities. 
IL2 
Ensure data security when 
exchanging data 
Implement appropriate security mechanisms to safeguard data 
exchange. 
Non-functional requirements for client and server layers 
NF1 
Achieve a high degree of 
automation 
Perform monitoring actions with a high degree of automation. 
NF2 
Achieve a high degree of 
adaptability 
Achieve a high degree of adaptability that involves the ability to adjust to 
new conditions or change due to a new use or purpose. 
NF3 Enable traceability of operations 
Inform about how and when certification-relevant data were gathered 
and analyzed. 
4.2.1 Client: Data-Gathering Layer 
Gather relevant data for cloud service certifications (REQ-DGL1): when performing CSC, certification 
authorities require diverse data sets to evaluate adherence to certification criteria. Prior to designing a 
CSC monitoring system, a cloud service provider and certification authority must specify a set of 
certification criteria that they will constantly check because cloud service providers cannot provide 
(monitoring) data to assess every certification criterion. As one cloud service provider said: “There are no 
hard and fast rules about which criterion can be monitored. Availability for example. Availability can be 
assessed automatically”. Cloud service (infrastructures) are highly heterogenic; therefore, authorities will 
differ in the extent to which they focus on the items that they should monitor and audit. As one certification 
authority representative said: “We need to identify the lowest common denominator of criteria that can be 
checked”.  
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The most frequently demanded criterion during our interviews involved ensuring service availability; 
therefore, a CSC monitoring system must gather data on cloud service availability, maintaining system 
redundancy, and operating data recovery mechanisms. As one cloud service customer said: 
If I outsource my data to the cloud, I need to be sure that I can access my data at any time. 
Service availability plays a major role because, with availability, I ensure that my business is 
able to work. 
The second most important criterion involved ensuring that a cloud service provider processes and stores 
data in locations that comply with legal requirements. As one cloud service customer said: 
For us, it is important that data that we outsource to the cloud will stay in [country X]. We have 
made some special agreements with our cloud service providers to ensure that they do not set 
up a new data center in [country Y] to save costs. I imagine that a continuous certification will 
validate that these conditions are still true. 
Finally, cloud experts demanded penetration testing to ensure that a certification authority identifies any 
potential system vulnerabilities at an early stage. As one cloud service customer said: “To be sure that 
you cannot be attacked from the outside. That is the most important thing for providers”. Other certification 
criteria that certification authorities may audit during CSC include validating access management, testing 
the correctness of provided service functionalities, ensuring the longevity of a cloud service provider, 
assessing exit-management processes, and proving adherence to service-level agreements. Table 4 
summarizes example certification criteria that the cloud experts discussed often. These findings concur 
with the findings in previous research that has analyzed certification criteria catalogues to identify criteria 
that require continuous validation (Lins et al., 2018). 
Table 4. Certification Criteria that Should Be Monitored 
Certification criteria Description 
Availability 
Gather data on cloud service availability and information on maintaining system redundancy 
and operating data-recovery mechanisms. 
Data 
location 
Track data processing and storage locations to validate that data complies with legal 
requirements. 
Penetration 
testing 
Perform regular penetration tests to reveal potential system vulnerabilities. 
Access 
management 
Provide data about securing access to cloud resources, including prevention of unauthorized 
access to resources, limited access of administrators, and information on managing 
passwords and assessing and adjusting access rules. 
Process 
operation 
Verify that cloud providers operate organizational processes as defined in process 
specifications. 
Data 
encryption 
Analyze whether a cloud provider maintains encryption and whether such encryption 
achieves a high level of security. In addition, provide evidence that cloud providers operate 
encryption-management processes (e.g., key management processes). 
Data loss 
Provide information on maintaining and operating mechanisms that prevent (customer) data 
loss. 
Data handling Monitor who has accessed and modified data. 
Continuity 
management 
Verify that cloud providers operate continuity-management processes as defined in process 
specifications. 
Exit 
management 
Analyze whether data-exports mechanisms remain in place to ensure data portability in case 
of switching the cloud service provider. 
Functionality Assess that offered functions work properly. 
Patch 
management 
Provide evidence that cloud providers patch software and systems regularly. 
Gather data by relying on existing monitoring technologies (REQ-DGL2): to fulfill a certification 
authority’s data needs, cloud service providers have to gather most certification-relevant monitoring 
information themselves and subsequently make these data accessible because external certification 
authorities lack comprehensive access to a provider’s systems. As one certification authority 
representative said: “The monitoring is under control of the cloud service provider. In regard to data 
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provisioning and what is gathered and aggregated, it resides at the provider’s side”. To prevent 
multifarious cloud risks, providers continuously monitor their service infrastructures and equip their data 
centers with sophisticated monitoring technologies that can rapidly detect malicious behavior, failures, and 
outages. As two separate cloud service providers said: 
It is called [monitoring tool X]. With this tool, you can simulate application interactions, for 
example, an ordering process in the online portal. 
Yes, we check on which location the virtual machines of our customers are currently running. 
Leveraging these monitoring technologies for CSC can provide certification authorities with detailed 
insights about service operation that surpass what they can measure themselves. Available data sets and 
required data must align with each other, which may mean that a cloud service provider needs to extend 
monitoring technologies’ current data-collection capabilities or implement additional data-collection 
mechanisms. Then, a CSC monitoring system should gather relevant data from existing monitoring 
technologies. 
Consider monitoring the cloud supply chain (REQ-DGL3): cloud experts emphasized that cloud 
services typically rely on entangled supply chains because they integrate different subproviders. As one 
cloud service provider said: “We do not have the knowledge in our own company, and we, therefore, have 
several special purpose companies that we have to integrate into our cloud”. For example, a SaaS 
provider may rely on a PaaS provider to offer its cloud services in an efficient and cost-effective manner. 
Conversely, the offered cloud service depends on the underlying platform and its quality. Thus, 
unsurprisingly, the interviewed cloud customers demanded CSC processes that include or at least 
consider integrated subproviders. One cloud service customer said: “This is indispensable. …For me as a 
customer, it is irrelevant whether the software of the provider or the infrastructure of the subprovider is 
unavailable”. In return, cloud service providers doubt that one can easily integrate subproviders into the 
CSC process. One cloud service provider said: “If I tell them [the subproviders] they have to be certified, I 
really limit myself when selecting some subproviders”. Thus, an entangled supply chain may limit data 
collection and CSC processes. Cloud service providers should evaluate whether they can gather 
additional information about their subproviders’ performance as their customers and the certification 
criteria require. 
Ensure data confidentiality during data collection (REQ-DGL4): when collecting certification-relevant 
data, cloud service providers should carefully determine the monitoring data that the certification 
authorities require and whether gathering these data causes a conflict with any data protection, legal, or 
company regulations. As one cloud service provider said: “We often have to check whether log files and 
monitoring files are in accordance with data protection laws. …We often have problems when arguing why 
we need all these data and to map data to specific purposes”. Specifically, cloud experts argue that 
gathering data about user actions should be limited to prevent employee surveillance. As one cloud 
service provider said: “An administrator does not see the exact user who has generated a certain event”. 
In addition, CSC monitoring systems should not gather and analyze customer data because revealing 
sensitive customer data may breach service-level agreements, which may require financial compensation. 
As one cloud service customer said: “For me, it is obvious that no customer data are checked but cloud 
service functions are examined to prove that the service is running and operates as expected”. 
Consequently, CSC monitoring systems must ensure data confidentiality to comply with data-protection 
regulations. 
4.2.2 Server: Application Layer  
Enable data aggregation (REQ-AL1): typically, monitoring technologies gather data for each computing 
resource individually (e.g., information on availability for each server). However, certification authorities 
focus on consolidated information about general cloud service behavior. As one certification authority 
representative said: “[Monitoring technology X] generates 20,000, 30,000 messages per day. These 
messages have to be interpreted, aggregated, weighted, and then assessed”. Therefore, a CSC 
monitoring system should aggregate monitoring data from individual resources to construct meaningful 
and significant status indicators about respective cloud services. Because cloud services comprise 
hundreds of interconnected systems that interact to create the service, data aggregation reduces a 
service evaluation’s complexity, scope, and depth and generates high-level indicators that certification 
authorities can employ to perform efficient assessments. As one cloud service provider said: “A service 
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request goes through the login service, identification service, across the web service and application 
server, and to the database, creating a wealth of information”. 
Ensure data protection (REQ-AL2): when cloud service providers transfer data to a certification 
authority, they must ensure they protect the monitoring data to prevent sensitive information (e.g., 
personal information) from leaking. As one certification authority representative said: “Which data will be 
anonymized? It depends. We will analyze personal data that are associated with audit-relevant data. Yet, 
which employee has worked on which ticket will be obfuscated”. Likewise, a CSC monitoring system must 
obfuscate security-relevant information that may reveal any service vulnerabilities. As one cloud service 
customer said: “I have no interest in communicating any service vulnerabilities that have been revealed 
during the certification process. Malicious attackers might misuse this information and threaten my data”. 
Cloud experts also expressed concerns regarding blindly trusting the certification authority and the 
intentions of their employees as one cloud service consultant noted: “I have some problems with 
transmitting data because I am not able to verify that the certification authority employs trustworthy 
people”. 
Enable data filtering (REQ-AL3): in addition to the need for data aggregation, the interviews revealed 
that a CSC monitoring system must filter data before a cloud service provider transmits the data to a 
certification authority for several reasons. Certification authorities have different certification and auditing 
scopes and require variable amounts of information. As one certification authority representative said: 
If the certification criteria will be checked by two different groups of auditors, for example, a 
criterion concerning the access control. As an IT service management auditor, I have to make a 
simple audit regarding access control. While somebody, for example, in Germany, a legal 
auditing company that has to do access control, they have to go even further…and deeper. If I 
do not determine the auditor group before, I might show an insufficient amount of information or 
too much. 
While an insufficient amount of certification-relevant information may hamper a certification authority’s 
ability to evaluate certification adherence, an excessive amount of information may create risks for cloud 
service providers and certification authorities. As two separate certification authority representatives said: 
I can imagine certain information and several metrics that you do not want to analyze because 
you are then exposed to liability risks. 
Your customers will call you crazy if you provide auditors with the means to inspect everything.  
4.2.3 Server: Data Layer 
Enable data archiving (REQ-DL1): certification authorities care about comparing current data with 
historic data to identify any previous criteria deviations, increase CSC process traceability, or conduct 
trend analyses. As one cloud service provider said: 
What does a certification tell you? On average, 90% of all tests were successful for the last 
year. And then, you have to store the monitoring data for the whole year. Otherwise, I am not 
able to provide evidence…. As a customer, I am interested in what the cloud service looked like 
on every day for the past year. 
Further, a cloud service consultant said: “Why should cloud service providers backup historic monitoring 
data? To conduct any trend analysis or identify issues”. 
Consequently, a CSC monitoring system should archive collected and processed monitoring data for 
certain periods. Archiving data may force cloud service providers to store a vast amount of data over time. 
As one cloud service provider said: “Access logs, change logs, and changes in management systems for 
10 years retrospectively. Meanwhile, we have a remarkable amount of data stored. This should not be 
underestimated!”.  
Ensure data integrity (REQ-DL2): despite the benefits of monitoring-based CSC, a cloud service 
provider’s providing certification-relevant data has one drawback: the risk of low data integrity due to 
deliberate data manipulation. Providers may modify or euphemize provided data to assure certification 
criteria adherence. As two cloud service providers said: 
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If I am a software developer and I am aware that the certification depends on the results that my 
software generates, of course, service providers or software producers are tempted to 
manipulate the data. In keeping with the motto, transmitting everything is okay. 
I have worked with so many log files. Everyone can easily manipulate these. Say, in case I 
transmit data, I inspect the log files before and check whether the data are in accordance with 
the certification criteria. 
Therefore, preventing cloud service providers from manipulating certification-relevant data is an important 
prerequisite to ensure trustworthy and reliable CSC.  
4.2.4 Server: Interface Layer 
Providing certification-relevant data (REQ-IL1): in addition to gathering data, providers must manage 
how they provide certification-relevant information to ensure ongoing data exchange with certification 
authorities. Service providers must establish an internal certification department that manages and 
supervises when the provider collects, processes, provides, and transmits certification-relevant 
information. A CSC monitoring system should provide respective functionalities that enable cloud service 
providers to flawlessly and continuously exchange data with certification authorities. 
Ensure data security when exchanging data (REQ-IL2): providers face novel security- and data-
protection issues when providing monitoring data to external certification authorities. Most of these issues 
arise due to existing monitoring technologies that cloud service providers deploy only for organizational 
monitoring purposes. Thus, interactions with certification authorities do not fall in the scope of traditional 
monitoring technologies. As one cloud service provider said: 
That I have to provide various data to the auditor is a risk for me. In case data are leaked or not, 
it is different whether the auditor is in my company and I have full control versus I have to 
provide data automatically. It is definitely a risk for me. 
Attackers may be interested in targeting data transmissions to retrieve or modify exchanged data. 
Modified data may affect how a certification authority assesses criteria adherence and may cause 
certification non-adherence.  
4.2.5 Non-functional Requirements for Client and Server Layers 
Achieve a high degree of automation (REQ-NF1): performing CSC requires certification authorities to 
frequently collect and analyze data. To be efficient and cost-effective, CSC requires a high degree of 
standardization and automation. As one cloud service provider said: “Full automation. Because what is not 
automated won’t be done properly”. Further, a cloud service customer said: “It should be automated as 
manual work requires time and might result in failures”. Subsequently, CSC imposes high requirements 
for CSC monitoring systems, such as performing data-collection, data-analysis, and data-aggregation 
mechanisms automatically. Nevertheless, cloud service experts expressed concerns regarding fully 
automating monitoring operations for each certification criteria. As one cloud service provider said: 
“Automation, it depends on the [certification] criterion. What you can automatically check is availability. 
…You have to differentiate between what can be automated and what cannot. There are definitely things 
that you cannot automate”.  
In addition to reducing costs and errors, a high degree of automation enables on-demand auditing that 
increases the trustworthiness and transparency of CSC processes. As two separate cloud service 
providers said: 
Okay, I press this button, and then I see the results. This creates trust for our customers. 
I am instantly able to communicate with customers, internal departments, or whoever is 
interested. Everything is okay or there are some problems here and there. 
Certification authorities require on-demand auditing to assess whether a cloud service still adheres to 
certification criteria or when they want to initiate a (quick) separate validation due to major changes in the 
cloud service. As one cloud service customer said: “I imagine in regard to higher flexibility; I change the 
cloud infrastructure and depending on the change, I initiate an additional check”. Consequently, CSC 
monitoring systems may provide the functionality to collect and analyze data on demand.  
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Achieve a high degree of adaptability (REQ-NF2): while certification authorities and cloud service 
providers frequently adjust the CSC process to cope with an ever-changing environment, a CSC 
monitoring system should achieve a high degree of adaptability that involves the ability to adjust to new 
conditions or change due to a new use or purpose. Emerging environmental threats or legal and 
regulatory landscape changes may induce certification authorities to adjust their auditing scope by, for 
example, adding new certification criteria. In these cases, a CSC monitoring system should be easily 
extendable to enable certification authorities to monitor these new criteria. As one cloud service provider 
said: “New parameters can be included dynamically and then integrated into continuous monitoring 
operations”. Architectural changes to cloud services (e.g., adding hardware components or new service 
functionalities) can cause providers to adjust their monitoring processes and, thus, the CSC monitoring 
system. As one cloud service consultant said: “I mean that [the CSC monitoring system] is a living object. 
In line with technological or other changes, it has to be adjusted and maintained”. Ensuring a high degree 
of adaptability provides a basis for an up-to-date monitoring system that can address emerging 
challenges. As one cloud service provider said: “It is important for me that we are compliant with the 
current situation, security levels, and requirements”. 
Enable traceability of operations (REQ-NF3): the interviewed cloud experts emphasized that they 
needed to inform customers about how and when they gathered and analyzed certification-relevant data 
in addition to presenting information regarding certification adherence. One cloud service customer said: “I 
wish that one is able to gain insight into the certification process”. Further, a cloud service consultant said: 
Based on my experience with customers, there are two or three parties. The first party wants to 
join in and have a say in the matter. The others want to be left alone in line with the slogan: you 
should ensure that everything is okay, and I do not need to know anything else. Between these 
parties are endless interim stages. 
Certification authorities especially need to ensure traceability in cases where cloud service customers 
must prove that their outsourced IT resources are secure. As one cloud service customer said: “In the 
end, I also require some evidence in case of emerging questions, for example, when I’m audited by a 
legal auditing company”. When achieving a high degree of traceability, CSC monitoring systems can 
increase the comprehensibility and trustworthiness of CSC processes. As one cloud service customer 
said: “Trust will then be increased. I do not have to solely trust that there is actually something going on. 
Instead, I am able to check by myself or at least see the results”. 
5 Suggestion Phase: Proposing Design Guidelines 
5.1 Research Steps to Derive Design Guidelines 
In the suggestion phase, one tests whether one can transfer the formulated meta-requirements into a 
tentative design or not (Beck et al., 2013; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008). Thus, we derived design 
guidelines for CSC monitoring systems for addressing meta-requirements. Researchers typically draw 
suggestions for a problem solution from the problem domain’s existing knowledge base (Vaishnavi 
& Kuechler, 2015). Grounding information artifacts’ design in justificatory knowledge not only increases 
how well the designer understands the problem domain but also helps the designer formulate high-level 
design guidelines independent of technological constraints and specific implementation details (Arazy, 
Kumar, & Shapira, 2010). In addition, grounding a design on justificatory knowledge explains why an 
artifact takes the form that it does and why it works (Gregor & Jones, 2007).  
Because both the environment (people, organizations, and existing technologies) and the knowledge base 
(Hevner et al., 2004) influence IS research, we looked into related literature, surveyed existing monitoring 
technologies, and analyzed interview findings to incorporate practical domain knowledge. IS theorists 
widely include extant literature alongside the empirical data as a means to raise their overall analyses to a 
higher conceptual level (Beck et al., 2013; Fernandez, 2004; Levina & Vaast, 2005). Figure 5 summarizes 
the knowledge base that we used as a guide to design CSC monitoring systems. 
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Figure 5. Knowledge Base that Guide the Design of CSC Monitoring Systems 
We first reviewed literature on CSC (refer to Sections 2.2 and 2.3) and related concepts (namely, 
continuous monitoring and auditing) (refer to Lins et al., 2018, 2015). We define continuous monitoring, 
which service providers perform, as the ongoing observance and analysis of operational states of systems 
and applications to provide decision support, detect and diagnose problems, and provide information for 
subsequent analyses (Mell et al., 2012). We define continuous auditing, which certification authorities 
perform, as a methodology that enables independent auditors to provide written assurance on a subject 
matter using a series of auditors’ reports issued virtually simultaneously with, or a short period of time 
after, the occurrence of events underlying the subject matter (Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 1999). Second, we assessed a comprehensive set of monitoring technologies to gather 
information on their architecture, data-gathering capabilities, and interfaces to deepen our understanding 
about designing CSC monitoring systems (refer to Appendix E for an overview). Finally, we reexamined 
interview statements for each meta-requirement to exploit interviewees’ practical domain knowledge when 
deriving design guidelines. By grounding the design approach on this knowledge base, we could derive a 
set of design guidelines for CSC monitoring systems that can address meta-requirements. In Section 5.2, 
we summarize the derived design guidelines. 
5.2 Design Guidelines for CSC Monitoring Systems 
Figure 6 depicts the tentative design of a CSC monitoring system architecture that embeds derived 
guidelines, and Appendix F summarizes the derived design guidelines. Researchers and practitioners 
may use this tentative design to implement an IT artifact in the future. 
 
Figure 6. Tentative Design of a CSC Monitoring System 
5.2.1 Leverage Existing Monitoring Technologies to Gather Certification-relevant Data 
A CSC monitoring system can leverage existing monitoring technologies to gather certification-relevant 
data (achieving REQ-DGL2), such as 1) IT infrastructure-monitoring systems, 2) special-purpose 
monitoring tools, and 3) monitoring plugins (refer to Table 5).  
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Table 5. Design Guidelines to Leverage Existing Monitoring Technologies 
ID Design guideline Description 
Corresponding 
meta-requirements 
DG-1 
Leveraging IT 
infrastructure-
monitoring systems 
Integrate IT infrastructure monitoring systems as they typically 
monitor applications, services, operating systems, system metrics, 
and network infrastructures. 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-DGL2 
REQ-NF1 
REQ-NF2 DG-2 
Leveraging 
monitoring tools 
Leverage monitoring tools to gain detailed insights about cloud 
service and process operations that surpass the capabilities of 
infrastructure monitoring systems. 
DG-3 
Leveraging 
monitoring plugins 
Leverage monitoring plugins to extend monitoring technologies’ 
capabilities. 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-NF2 
These monitoring technologies provide certification authorities with detailed insights into cloud system 
performance, security, and reliability (achieving REQ-DGL1). Table 6 summarizes monitoring technologies 
that researchers have developed (and evaluated) that support collecting data for representative 
certification criteria. Furthermore, IT infrastructure-monitoring systems and monitoring tools exhibit unique 
characteristics that increase their relevance for being leveraged to perform monitoring-based CSC. First, 
most monitoring technologies embed functions to export gathered data to ASCII coded text files, HTML, or 
CSV log files or provide an API for requesting files that enable post-processing with external software (i.e., 
the CSC monitoring system; achieving REQ-DGL2). Second, they exhibit a high degree of automation by 
using automated agent schedulers, event-driven patterns, and automated (resource) discovery functions, 
and by allowing execution of external automation scripts (achieving REQ-NF1). Finally, monitoring 
technologies prominently feature an extendable architecture that allows one to easily integrate them with 
third-party monitoring plugins (achieving REQ-NF2). 
Table 6. Certification Criteria that a CSC Monitoring System can Monitor by Leveraging Existing Monitoring 
Technologies  
Certification criteria Example monitoring technologies Source 
Availability 
Adaptive distributed monitoring architectures that 
automatically monitor availability of resources, servers, 
and services. 
Calero & Aguado (2015), Xiang et al. 
(2010) 
Data 
location 
Monitoring architecture for checking data location 
compliance in federated cloud infrastructures. 
Massonet et al. (2011) 
Penetration testing 
Web application security-testing methodologies to test 
for evidence of vulnerabilities in the application due to 
deficiencies with identified security controls. 
Chang & Ramachandran (2016), 
LaBarge & McGuire (2012) 
Access 
management 
Monitoring infrastructures that monitor users’ behavior 
to detect anomalies and account misuse and posteriori 
techniques to verify compliance with privacy policies. 
Doelitzscher, Reich, Knahl, Passfall, 
& Clarke (2012), Leeuw, Fischer-
Hübner, Tseng, & Borking (2008) 
Process 
operation 
Applying process mining to gain insights into how 
processes are being undertaken by analyzing workflow 
models and a vast amount of data that is routinely 
gathered and stored in event logs. 
Accorsi, Lowis, & Sato (2011), Jans, 
Alles, & Vasarhelyi (2013) 
Data loss 
Performing automatic backup integrity checks to 
ensure the recovery of corrupted files. 
Chen & Lee (2014) 
Data 
handling 
Simultaneously monitoring data integrity in cases of 
multiple and hybrid clouds with multiple owners. 
Yang & Jia (2013), Zhu et al. (2013) 
Patch 
management 
Applying formal languages to identify which patch has 
been applied and which is missing. 
Koschorreck (2011) 
Leveraging IT infrastructure monitoring systems: IT infrastructure-monitoring systems form an 
indispensable core for monitoring tasks when cloud service providers operate a cloud service 
infrastructure. A broad range of commercial (e.g., Amazon CloudWatch and AzureWatch) and open-
source cloud monitoring systems exist (e.g., Nagios, Zabbix and Icinga) (Aceto, Botta, Donato, & 
Pescapè, 2013; Fatema et al., 2014). Accordingly, research on continuous monitoring proposes and 
evaluates general cloud monitoring architectures (Katsaros, Kübert, & Gallizo, 2011; Povedano-Molina, 
Lopez-Vega, Lopez-Soler, Corradi, & Foschini, 2013) and monitoring architectures for virtualized 
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environments (Clayman, Clegg, Mamatas, Pavlou, & Galis, 2011; Xiang et al., 2010). Refer to Syed, Gani, 
Ahmad, Khan, and Ahmed (2017) for a recent overview of systems and related research. These IT 
infrastructure monitoring systems can gather an extensive range of data because they monitor 
applications, services, operating systems, system metrics, and network infrastructures and provide key 
performance indicators for both platforms and applications (achieving REQ-DGL1) (Aceto et al., 2013). 
For example, Nagios provides functions to gather relevant monitoring data actively (i.e., Nagios executes 
a plugin on a host or service to poll information) and passively (i.e., external applications submit 
information to Nagios) that Nagios then uses to analyze the availability of infrastructure components and 
to perform capacity planning, among others.  
Leveraging monitoring tools: in addition to infrastructure-monitoring systems, providers often implement 
and operate monitoring tools for special purposes. These monitoring tools provide various monitoring 
functions, such as network scanning (e.g., Nmap, Angry IP Scanner), network packet analysis (e.g., 
Wireshark, Bro Network Security Monitor), vulnerability scanning (e.g., Lynis, Qualys), penetration testing 
(e.g., OWASP Zed Attack Proxy), database monitoring (e.g., DBAmon), and process or workflow 
management (e.g., Widen Collective, Nintex), and special cloud monitoring (e.g., Hyperic HQ). Similarly, 
prior research on continuous monitoring proposes specific tools and techniques to detect intrusions (Modi 
et al., 2013), monitor service-level agreements (Comuzzi & Spanoudakis, 2010; Emeakaroha et al., 2012), 
and so on. While infrastructure-monitoring systems currently have limited data-analysis capabilities, 
monitoring tools typically contain rich data-analysis functions for specific purposes. For example, the IT 
monitoring system Zabbix evaluates monitoring data by continuously observing user-defined thresholds 
and evaluating logical definitions of problem states only, whereas the monitoring tool Qualys 
(continuously) scans complex internal networks to collect comprehensive information that it analyzes in 
detail to detect security, compliance, and other issues. Consequently, leveraging these monitoring tools 
for CSC can provide certification authorities with detailed insights about cloud service and process 
operations that surpass the capabilities of infrastructure monitoring systems (achieving REQ-DGL1). 
Leveraging monitoring plugins: given the extendable architecture of monitoring technologies that allows 
one to easily integrate third-party monitoring plugins into them (achieving REQ-NF2), large communities 
have formed that focus on steadily extending monitoring technologies’ functionalities. Typically, one can 
access monitoring plugins over sharing platforms, and these plugins fall under open-source licenses that 
enable programmers to modify or adapt plugins to a particular monitoring scenario. For example, the 
Nagios’ Exchange platform includes more than 5,700 listings of various add-ons and extensions that 
enable administrators to extend core functionalities, use alternative user interfaces, and integrate new 
components for the monitoring system Nagios (achieving REQ-DGL1). Therefore, cloud service providers 
can leverage monitoring plugins to easily extend monitoring technologies’ capabilities (refer to Appendix G 
for example plugins that may be useful in the monitoring-based CSC context). 
5.2.2 Access External Interfaces 
Besides leveraging existing monitoring technologies, a CSC monitoring system may also connect to 
external sources that provide valuable information (achieving REQ-DGL1), which Table 7 summarizes. 
Table 7. Design Guidelines to Access External Interfaces 
ID Design guideline Description 
Corresponding 
meta-requirements 
DG-4 
Integrate external 
databases 
Connect to databases that provide valuable information. REQ-DGL1 
DG-5 
Access interfaces of 
subproviders 
Access service interfaces of subproviders to gather 
information about certification adherence that subproviders 
provide. REQ-DGL3 
DG-6 
Monitor services of 
subproviders 
Incorporate means to measure services that subproviders 
provide (e.g., test-based CSC methodologies).  
Integrate external databases: a CSC monitoring system may gather additional information from external 
databases (achieving REQ-DGL1). As a cloud service consultant said: “It would be very nice if you have a 
public database…that tells you which versions you have and which versions are threatened by certain 
vulnerabilities”. For example, a CSC monitoring system can integrate the CVE security vulnerability 
database (refer to www.cvedetails.com) to gather information about current software vulnerabilities. This 
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and related databases provide detailed definitions of identified vulnerabilities, the measures that one 
should take to verify a vulnerability, and a score that ranks the vulnerability’s severity. 
Access or monitor interfaces of subproviders: few studies have explored the concept of cloud 
computing as a supply chain in detail even though monitoring the cloud supply chain pertains highly to 
cloud customers (Herrera & Janczewski, 2016). To achieve REQ-DGL3, cloud providers can distribute 
monitoring-based CSC across their supply chain partners. Thus, a supply chain partner may also 
implement a CSC monitoring system that gathers monitoring data to prove adherence to certification 
criteria. As one cloud service provider said: “I would obligate my subproviders to provide respective 
information or reports…that enable me to prove adherence to certification criteria”. The CSC system then 
offers an interface that partners can access to provide required evidence (achieving REQ-DGL3). In 
addition, a CSC monitoring system can implement test-based CSC methodologies because they measure 
a cloud service from the outside (e.g., refer to Stephanow and Banse (2017) and Stephanow and 
Khajehmoogahi (2017) for representative test-based procedures). As one certification authority 
representative said: “At least one can monitor interfaces that connect both services”. Nevertheless, the 
current lack of research about monitoring supply chain partners creates an opportunity for further research 
to apply theoretical concepts from supply chain coordination mechanisms adjusted to CSC’s specific 
features and challenges to develop new conceptual models and methodologies. 
5.2.3 Apply and Operate an Agent-based Architectural Model 
To gather certification-relevant data across different monitoring technologies and external interfaces, a 
CSC monitoring system should exhibit an agent-based architecture (refer to Table 8). 
Table 8. Design Guidelines to Apply and Operate an Agent-based Architectural Model 
ID Design guideline Description 
Corresponding 
meta-requirements 
DG-7 
Apply an agent-based 
architecture model 
Dispatch certification agents to different monitoring 
technologies to gather certain certification-relevant data. 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-DGL2 
REQ-NF1 
REQ-NF2 
DG-8 
Equip agents with 
security policies 
Agents can receive security policies to ensure that they 
comply with data-protection regulations or customer 
requirements. 
REQ-DGL4 
DG-9 
Perform service-focused 
aggregation by using 
agent teams 
Organize agents as hierarchically structured teams to 
aggregate data across monitoring technologies. 
REQ-AL1 
DG-10 
Store meta-information 
about agent operations 
Provided meta-information should comprise data on 1) 
what was monitored, 2) how it was monitored, 3) when it 
was monitored, 4) who performed the monitoring, and 5) 
the monitoring results. 
REQ-NF3 
Apply an agent-based architectural model: researchers and practitioners have already developed 
several architectural patterns and mechanisms to achieve an agent-based architecture, such as the JADE 
framework (Bellifemine, Poggi, & Rimassa, 2001). Under this architecture, a CSC monitoring system 
initiates a certification agent and dispatches it to different monitoring technologies to gather certain 
certification-relevant data (achieving REQ-DGL1 and REQ-DGL2). Agents are software objects that 
achieve individual goals by autonomously performing actions and reacting to events in a dynamic 
environment (Chou, Du, & Lai, 2007). Typically, an agent has mobility and intelligence. Mobility means 
that the agent can travel from one platform to another, and intelligence refers to the agent’s artificial 
intelligence that enables it to use sophisticated computation or behavioral models when working on data 
resources. A flexible agent-based architecture (e.g., platform independent) and an adaptable agent-based 
architecture (e.g., an agent can be deployed as required) facilitate data collection in a distributed and 
heterogeneous monitoring technology landscape (Wu, Shao, Ho, & Chang, 2008).  
A CSC monitoring system may build on automated agent schedulers, event-driven patterns, and 
automated (resource) discovery functions to achieve a high degree of automation (achieving REQ-NF1). 
Likewise, in terms of achieving a high degree of adaptability to address an ever-changing environment, an 
agent-based architecture allows the CSC monitoring system to flexibly and quickly integrate new agents to 
gather additional information because they are loosely coupled with monitoring technologies and can also 
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be added, removed, or reconfigured during runtime (achieving REQ-NF2) (Chou et al., 2007; Doelitzscher 
et al., 2012b).  
Equip agents with security policies: CSC monitoring systems must ensure data confidentiality when 
gathering required data. Assuring confidentiality involves preserving authorized restrictions on access and 
disclosure, which includes protecting personal privacy and proprietary information (National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology, 2002). In the context of monitoring-based CSC, cloud experts argue that a 
CSC monitoring system should not be able to gather data about user actions to prevent employee 
surveillance or customer data to adhere to service-level agreements. To ensure that dispatched agents 
comply with data-protection regulations or customer requirements, agents can receive security policies 
(achieving REQ-DGL4). Through security policies, each agent receives a rule set (its “intelligence”) that 
specifies allowed actions to limit the agent’s data-collection capabilities (Doelitzscher et al., 2012b). For 
example, one can equip an agent with a Jess rule engine (see http://www.jessrules.com/) and a 
knowledge base that contains gathered evidence (e.g., monitoring data) (Bellifemine et al., 2001). A set of 
action rules (i.e., in the form of Jess production rules), such as rules that derive new data by inserting 
them into the knowledge base and that lead an agent to execute a special action, represent the agent’s 
behavior. One may apply self-learning algorithms to further improve an agent’s intelligence (Doelitzscher 
et al., 2012v).  
Perform service-focused aggregation by using agent teams: a CSC monitoring system must 
aggregate monitoring data from individual resources to construct meaningful and significant status 
indicators of respective cloud services. Typically, a team of hierarchically structured agents perform 
aggregation tasks (achieving REQ-AL1) (Doelitzscher et al., 2012b; Ye, Yang, & Gan, 2012). For 
instance, each agent team comprises one captain agent, M mediator agents, and N operator agents (with 
0 < M < N). The captain and mediator agents mainly focus on coordination and aggregation, and operator 
agents collect necessary evidence from different monitoring technologies. By ordering agents in a 
hierarchical structure, agents can preprocess gathered information and share information, which leads to 
a reduced network load (Doelitzscher et al., 2012b). Furthermore, this structure increases the system’s 
scalability by reducing data sent to upper system layers. 
When aggregating data, cloud experts emphasize that a CSC monitoring system should aggregate data 
from a service perspective: data should be aggregated across computing resources (i.e., database and 
application servers) to create meaningful indicators that pertain to a particular service, such as a service 
availability indicator. As one cloud service provider said: 
We have to specify availability or performance indicators or related service indicators. …The 
certification authority has to say what features and attributes the service has to fulfill. Then, I [as 
a service provider] have to check whether I am able to monitor these. 
Therefore, an agent team must aggregate gathered data across integrated monitoring systems, plugins, 
tools, and cloud data centers to create meaningful service indicators. Similarly, agent teams can 
aggregate data in a temporal dimension to consolidate data that a CSC monitoring system and respective 
agent gather, for example, every minute or hour to reduce the complexity and the amount of information 
that certification authorities must analyze.  
When designing agent teams’ aggregation functionalities, researchers and practitioners can build on 
research findings that address (automated) monitoring of service-level agreement parameters; for 
instance, prior research proposes strategies to apply low-level metrics to high-level service-level 
agreement parameters (Emeakaroha, Brandic, Maurer, & Dustdar, 2010). In the CSC context, Stephanow 
and Fallenbeck (2015) show examples of how one can use low-level metrics (i.e., the number of logins 
and the number of terminating instances) to construct complex metrics to help validate certification 
criteria, such as metrics for service scalability and availability and a metric that describes anomalous 
behavior. Building on their findings, a CSC monitoring system may also embed complex event-processing 
engines (Cugola & Margara, 2012) where complex metrics can be represented as queries that agents 
perform and applied to event streams (i.e., values of low-level monitoring metrics) (Stephanow 
& Fallenbeck, 2015). 
Store meta-information about agent operations: providers must log, store, and transmit meta-
information about CSC monitoring system operations because certification authorities and customers 
demand traceable monitoring results. As one cloud service customer said: “It should be evident which 
controls were done and when these controls were done”. This meta-information should include data on 1) 
what was monitored, 2) how it was monitored, 3) when it was monitored, 4) who performed the monitoring, 
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and 5) the monitoring results. Consequently, a CSC monitoring system should store information on agent 
operations. For example, an agent that a cloud service provider operates (4) collects intrusion information 
(1) that contains certain evidence (5) by relying on an intrusion detection system (2) that analyzes 
incoming data packages in real-time (3). To gather relevant information, agents may rely on the 
corresponding monitoring technology’s internal databases because monitoring technologies typically 
gather information on their own performance and operations (achieving REQ-NF3). For instance, Zabbix 
provides a function for internal checks that allows one to monitor its internal operations, such as when it 
executes (i.e., every second) and who its individual monitoring processes target (i.e., a particular server). 
5.2.4 Incorporate and Secure Flexible Data Storages 
A CSC monitoring system must store and archive gathered evidence so it can later archive it for 
processing and transmit it to certification authorities. In addition, CSC monitoring systems must ensure the 
stored data’s integrity. Table 9 summarizes respective design guidelines. 
Table 9. Guidelines to Incorporate and Secure Flexible Data Storages 
ID Design guideline Description 
Corresponding 
meta-requirements 
DG-11 
Incorporate flexible data 
storage technologies to 
store and archive data 
Incorporate flexible data storage technologies to easily 
adjust data schemes and store additional data or results 
from new data analysis operations in, for example, a 
NoSQL document database. 
REQ-DL1 
REQ-NF2 
DG-12 
Implement means to 
guard data against 
improper modification 
Integrate a trusted third-party module that provides secure 
log encryption functions, establish a chain of custody for 
digital evidence, or apply other techniques from the cloud 
forensics domain to prevent internal log manipulation. 
REQ-DL2 
Incorporate flexible data storage technologies to store and archive data: (captain) agents can gather 
and store certification-relevant data in supplementary databases, such as audit data marts (Rezaee, 
Sharbatoghlie, Elam, & McMickle, 2002). Audit data marts refer to small data repositories in the form of 
log files, historic tables, or data warehouses that store relevant data and enable real-time data access and 
automated data analyses. Traditional monitoring technologies typically incorporate data storage units built 
on rigorous data schemes and cannot address the scalability and flexibility challenges that contemporary 
applications encounter. Conversely, a CSC monitoring system should incorporate flexible data storage 
technologies to easily adjust data schemes and store additional data or results from new data-analysis 
operations (achieving REQ-NF2). Recently, NoSQL database technologies have gained momentum 
because they possess greater flexibility and scalability than traditional SQL databases (Madison, Barnhill, 
Napier, & Godin, 2015). Research of NoSQL database technologies has revealed many NoSQL database 
varities (e.g., key-value stores, document databases, wide-column stores, and graph databases) that each 
serve specific functions (Madison et al., 2015; Meijer & Bierman, 2011; Moniruzzaman & Hossain, 2013). 
NoSQL document databases seem to suit CSC monitoring systems because they can manage and store 
encoded documents, such as XML or JSON files, that existing monitoring technologies typically generate 
(Moniruzzaman & Hossain, 2013).  
In addition to storing data, a CSC monitoring system must archive gathered and processed monitoring 
data for certain periods to ensure it can access historic data (achieving REQ-DL1). For data-analysis 
purposes, comparing current data with historic data can help agents to learn and configure exceptions and 
alert patterns (e.g., rule-based configurations based on deviations from historic data). To reduce the 
storage load of archived data, the CSC monitoring system must specify retention periods (e.g., based on a 
certification authority’s needs, customers’ needs, or regulatory requirements). Then, a CSC monitoring 
system must implement appropriate mechanisms to securely and automatically delete outdated data (refer 
to Kissel, Regenscheid, Scholl, and Stine (2014) for guidelines on media sanitization).  
Implement means to guard data against improper modification: CSC systems must implement 
mechanisms that ensure data integrity because monitoring-based CSC bears the risk that the provider 
may manipulate data. Ensuring integrity involves guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity (National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology, 2002). First, cloud experts empathize that a monitoring system should collect 
data only from live systems; it should not collect data from test or backup systems. As one cloud service 
consultant said: “Continuous monitoring of live systems. We are only interested in live systems, not in any 
484 Designing Monitoring Systems for Continuous Certification of Cloud Services 
 
Volume 44  10.17705/1CAIS.04425 Paper 25 
 
test systems”. Further, a certification authority representative said: “Nothing else is meaningful”. The 
interviewed cloud experts jointly recommended integrating a trusted third-party module (e.g., hardware or 
virtual module) that provides secure log encryption functions to prevent internal log manipulation 
(achieving REQ-DL2). As one cloud service provider said: “You have to implement some certified or 
signed module to prevent any manipulation”. Further, a certification authority representative said: “One 
might implement a foreign machine or hardware security module, something like that, that uses 
cryptographic techniques to show that the data are correct”. A trusted third-party security module provides 
secure encryption functions, and a trusted third-party manages and stores encryption and metadata (e.g., 
encryption keys, certificates, and authentication data) to prevent provider manipulation and enable 
external auditability (Kunz, Niehues, & Waldmann, 2013).  
To prevent manipulation, CSC monitoring system designers can build on findings from research on cloud 
forensics. Cloud forensics refers to applying scientific principles and technological practices to reconstruct 
past cloud computing events by identifying, collecting, preserving, examining, interpreting, and reporting 
digital evidence (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014). Researchers have proposed 
various procedures to address the challenges with cloud forensics (i.e., malicious cloud service providers 
that manipulate log files). These cloud forensic procedures enable third-party investigators to collect and 
analyze reliable data (Pichan, Lazarescu, & Soh, 2015). For example, one method for revealing data 
manipulation involves establishing a chain of custody for digital evidence, which represents a roadmap 
showing how data were collected, analyzed, and preserved for presentation as evidence in court (Lin, 
Lee, & Wu, 2012). Researchers have proposed several procedures to gather trusted certification-relevant 
data, such as remotely acquiring data over trusted and secure channels, using management planes, 
performing live forensics on systems in a running state, and snapshotting a clone of a virtual image (refer 
to Pichan et al. (2015) for a detailed comparison). Consequently, a CSC monitoring system may contain 
various remedial techniques to prevent manipulation in monitoring-based CSC (achieving REQ-DL2). 
5.2.5 Secure Data Exchange 
Prior to cloud service providers’ transferring data to a certification authority, they must mask and filter 
gathered monitoring data to limit access to sensitive information and prevent it from leaking. Then, cloud 
service providers can either actively transmit certification-relevant data or provide it via an interface when 
the certification authority requests it. Regardless of the transmission modality, certification authorities 
recommend that cloud service providers provide meta-data containing information about deployed cloud 
service technologies, monitoring operations, monitoring system configurations, and data-collection 
frequencies (achieving REQ-NF3). These metadata help certification authorities to better understand and 
trace conducted monitoring operations, which they need to do to evaluate certification criteria adherence. 
Table 10 summarizes guidelines for data exchange. 
Table 10. Guidelines for Secure Data Exchange 
ID Design guideline Description 
Corresponding 
meta-requirements 
DG-13 
Embed data-masking 
techniques 
Embed data-masking techniques such as encryption, 
substitution, and nulling out. 
REQ-DGL4 
REQ-AL2 
REQ-IL2 
DG-14 
Implement attribute-
based access control 
and define access 
policies 
Implement an attribute-based access control to filter data 
according to an authority’s needs and privileges. Specify 
access policies that define the access rules for the 
allowable subjects, operations, and environmental 
conditions to the object. 
REQ-AL2 
REQ-AL3 
REQ-IL2 
DG-15 
Implement encrypted 
data-transmission means 
Provide functionalities to automatically generate reports 
based on analyzed data and automatically transmit 
encrypted reports about defined points in time. REQ-IL1 
REQ-IL2 
DG-16 
Implement secure data-
providing interfaces 
Implement passive interfaces that enable certification 
authorities to access data. 
Embed data-masking techniques: IS researchers have extensively employed the data–masking concept 
to increase the level of information security and protect data that organizations share with third parties 
(Baranchikov, Gromov, Gurov, Grinchenko, & Babaev, 2016; Domingo-Ferrer & Mateo-Sanz, 2002; 
Ravikumar, Rabi, Manjunath, Hegadi, & Archana, 2011). Data masking (also referred to as data 
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obfuscation and scrambling) refers to the process in which one obscures specific data elements in data 
stores. Data masking ensures that realistic (but not real) data replaces sensitive data to prevent the 
availability of sensitive information outside the authorized environment.  
Certification agents can employ several data-masking techniques when gathering data (achieving REQ-
DGL4 and REQ-AL2), such as substitution (replacing existing data with random values) and nulling out 
(deleting sensitive data and replacing a data field with NULL values) (Li & Motiwalla, 2009; Sarada, 
Abitha, Manikandan, & Sairam, 2015). Furthermore, a CSC monitoring system may apply encryption 
techniques that suit the CSC context because encryption offers the option of leaving data in place and 
visible to people with an appropriate key (i.e., employees of the cloud service provider) while remaining 
effectively useless to anybody without a key (i.e., employees of the certification authority). Therefore, a 
CSC monitoring system may encrypt data fragments that third parties should not read (achieving REQ-
AL2 and REQ-IL2).  
Cloud service providers can apply data-masking techniques in a CSC context when, for example, 
transmitting results from penetration tools. The interviewed experts regarded providing comprehensive 
results from a penetration test as critical because malicious certification authority employees may leak 
and/or misuse identified system vulnerabilities. For certification authorities, however, the results from 
penetration tests serve as excellent indicators to evaluate certification adherence and confirm secure 
services. In this case, a CSC monitoring system must mask the detailed results from penetration-testing 
tools and provide only abstract but certification-relevant information for certification authorities, such as 
“two minor security vulnerabilities and one major security vulnerability”. 
Implement attribute-based access control and define access policies: certification authorities require 
different amounts of information because they have different certification and auditing scopes. 
Consequently, a CSC monitoring system should provide a function to filter or limit access to gathered and 
stored data according to what a certification authority needs prior to data transmission. Data filtering 
involves redefining data sets to remove redundant or irrelevant data. 
A CSC monitoring system may implement an attribute-based access control to filter data according to an 
authority’s needs and privileges (achieving REQ-AL2, REQ-AL3, and REQ-IL2). Attribute-based access 
control represents a popular approach to access control that provides flexibility suitable for current 
dynamic distributed systems (Hu, Ferraiolo, Kuhn, Kacker, & Lei, 2015). In this approach, one grants or 
denies data-access or transmission requests based on arbitrary attributes of users, objects, and optionally 
environmental conditions that may be globally recognized and tailored to current policies. When setting up 
a CSC monitoring system, a cloud service provider must define policies that outline access rules for 
allowable subjects (i.e., authorities), operations (i.e., view monitoring data), and environmental conditions 
(i.e., a specific certification) with respect to an object (i.e., a monitoring file). A cloud service provider can 
derive policies depending on a certification authority’s data needs, such as the criteria that the latter will 
continuously check. Likewise, CSC monitoring systems and corresponding access policies should 
consider the individual audit focus of the respective certification authority. As one certification authority 
representative said: “The data should be limited to a specific perspective, like an operating or compliance 
management or audit management perspective”. 
Implement encrypted data transmission means: practitioners suggested that cloud service providers 
may actively transmit filtered and masked data (achieving REQ-IL1). As two separate cloud service 
providers said: 
Password security is ensured. Every week, we will generate a report from a password manager 
tool and send it to the auditor. 
Every day, I get a report about process operation; is there any deviation or issue with 
processes? […] I can provide this report to an auditor. 
For example, a certification authority needs to validate adherence to certification criterion, “a cloud service 
provider should regularly perform reviews of firewall rules” (Lins, Schneider, & Sunyaev, 2019; Schneider 
et al., 2014). To do so, a cloud service provider can transmit a short report that contains various data, 
such as the date, firewall policy version, number of offending firewall rules, initiated operations, and 
completed changes. To increase transmission efficiency, a CSC monitoring system should provide 
functions to automatically generate reports based on analyzed data and automatically transmit these 
reports about defined points in time (achieving REQ-IL1). 
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When transmitting data to certification authorities, cloud service providers must ensure that the data do 
not leak (e.g., due to a man-in-the-middle attack). In this scenario, an attacker secretly relays and possibly 
alters the communicated material between the certification authority and the provider who believe that 
they are directly communicating with each other. Therefore, a CSC system must encrypt data prior to 
sending the data to certification authorities (achieving REQ-IL2). 
Implement secure data-providing interfaces: a CSC monitoring system can implement passive 
interfaces that enable certification authorities to access data (achieving REQ-IL1). As one certification 
authority representative said: “[CSC monitoring system] provides an API, I can then access metrics that 
are provided and authorized. That would be nice”. Certification authorities may implement different types 
of data-providing interfaces, such as a standardized data-exchange interface that provides XML-formatted 
log files (i.e., allows direct data access or export of data). In addition, certification authorities state that a 
graphical user interface (i.e., a simple Web frontend that presents certification-relevant data) can support 
CSC processes. Existing monitoring technologies already provide a graphical user interface that allows 
users to inspect monitoring data, adjust monitoring configurations (e.g., monitoring frequency), invoke 
graphs and charts, and perform additional administrative actions. However, only administrators can use 
most user interfaces, whereas some monitoring systems, such as CA Unified Infrastructure Management, 
provide means to share dashboards with internal and external stakeholders with granular control, which 
enables certification authorities to inspect gathered and analyzed data.  
Providing relevant information via interfaces to certification authorities requires that providers implement 
robust and secure access control systems (achieving REQ-IL2). Similarly, providers must ensure that 
certification authorizes can access CSC monitoring systems and their interfaces. As a cloud service 
provider said: “This is prone to faults. Catchword: interface is shortly unavailable and I don’t have any data 
anymore”. Ensuring availability involves ensuring that a certification authority can access and use 
information in a timely and reliable manner (National Institutes of Standards and Technology, 2002). To 
disrupt the availability and process of CSC, attackers may target interfaces by, for example, performing a 
distributed denial-of-service attack. Therefore,  cloud service providers must implement appropriate 
countermeasures for potential attacks, such as limiting the number of failed login attempts or introducing 
time delays between successive attempts (achieving REQ-IL2). 
6 Discussion 
6.1 Advantages and Boundaries of Monitoring-Based Certification 
Although prior research has focused on developing and evaluating test-based CSC methodologies, test-
based certification requires that certification authorities can access the cloud infrastructure (which various 
issues may limit) and fails to deal with an ever-changing cloud infrastructure. Monitoring-based 
certification that leverages existing monitoring technologies to collect and provide certification-relevant 
data overcomes the limitations with test-based CSC because it does not require direct access to cloud 
infrastructure components. In this section, we discuss advantages and boundaries of monitoring-based 
certification based on the insights we gained from the interviews with cloud experts. 
Performing monitoring-based CSC benefits cloud service providers, certification authorities, and cloud 
service customers alike (Lins et al., 2016b; Teigeler et al., 2018). Cloud service providers receive ongoing 
third-party expert assessments about their systems. In addition, implementing a CSC monitoring system 
and evaluating monitoring results about how cloud services have performed improves the quality of 
internal processes and systems. Therefrom, providers can detect potential flaws and (security) incidents 
earlier and can save costs due to successive service improvements. In contrast to test-based CSC, cloud 
service providers can analyze data across different monitoring technologies and may identify any errors in 
the data before they transmit it to a certification authority and, hence, prevent false positives. As one cloud 
service provider said: “Because of a single negative event in the monitoring system that was caused by 
faulty operation or maintenance window or whatever, I do not want to communicate a negative service 
status even though there was no issue”.  
Certification authorities actively detect and investigate critical certification deviations as they occur, which 
increases certification reliability. Certification authorities can increase their auditing efficiency, achieve 
savings in their budgets, reduce operation times, and reduce operation fees by reducing auditing time and 
errors due to automated auditing processes. Likewise, monitoring-based CSC is more cost effective since 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 487 
 
Volume 44  10.17705/1CAIS.04425 Paper 25 
 
it enables certification authorities to test larger samples and examine data faster and more efficiently 
compared to their manual predecessors.  
Cloud service customers can benefit from CSC as well. Typically, cloud environments lack control since 
cloud customers cede governance to cloud service providers (ENISA, 2012). CSC can counteract this lack 
of control by increasing transparency about providers’ operations and by providing assurance about 
requirements (e.g., ensuring encryption, data integrity, and location), which can ultimately enhance cloud 
services’ trustworthiness. Informing customers in cases of critical certification violations or major security 
incidents has become even more important because organizations, individuals, and even societies and 
economies now highly depend on cloud services during their day-to-day activities (Benlian et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, monitoring-based CSC has some drawbacks. Performing monitoring-based involves a high 
degree of complexity because it requires cloud service providers to set up comprehensive monitoring 
infrastructures. Providers need to implement large-scale (continuous) monitoring technologies to ensure 
that they provide available, current, and accurate certification-relevant data and that, most importantly, 
they can transmit such data to certification authorities. Organizational employees can find integrating 
(expensive) hardware and software into their organizations’ existing IT infrastructures intimidating, 
particularly if it requires them to change their existing business practices or acquire new skills (Beatty, 
Shim, & Jones, 2001; Rogers, 2005). Consequently, decreasing system complexity and ensuring 
economic feasibility has critical importance when designing CSC monitoring systems. Nevertheless, 
interviewed cloud customers appreciated cloud service providers’ efforts when participating in CSC. As a 
cloud service customer said: “If a certification is like a toothless tiger, I does not provide any value. There 
have to be a certain level of suffering for the cloud service provider”. 
Similarly, continuously collecting, analyzing, and preparing data might have a substantial performance 
impact on cloud services. Failures in these operations may even disrupt the cloud service operation. 
Hence, a monitoring-based CSC might threaten cloud service availability. Therefore, cloud experts 
recommended performing CSC operations on parallel systems on a separate infrastructure (although 
collecting data from live systems) and defining economically viable data collection and analysis 
frequencies.  
Interviewees also expressed concerns regarding comparability of certification results when performing 
monitoring-based CSC. As one cloud service consultant said: “If we only focus on data that is provided by 
a service provider, comparability of monitoring results and certifications are limited”. Further, a cloud 
service customer said: “A certification has to be comparable. Comparability can only be achieve if 
monitoring algorithms are identical”.  
The most debated drawback with monitoring-based CSC relates to the risk that cloud service providers 
will manipulate data to assure they continue to adhere to certification criteria. Although we derived design 
guidelines to prevent cloud service providers from manipulating certification-relevant data, customers’ 
perceived risk of data manipulation may threaten trustworthiness in and reliability of monitoring-based 
CSC. Focus group participants and customers assessed a low likelihood that cloud service providers 
would internally modify data because continuous modification constitutes high expenditures. As one cloud 
service provider said: 
Let’s talk about a real world example. It is easy for every cloud service provider to modify its 
availability monitoring to prove that the cloud service is 100% available. They do not do this. 
Because the efforts are not outweighing the benefits. 
Data manipulation requires a provider to store data volume twice (i.e., the unmodified data for internal 
evaluations first and the modified data for certification authorities second). Customers might also reveal 
tampered data when using the service (e.g., tampered availability rate). As two separate cloud service 
providers said: 
Customers will notice manipulations as well. Let us say the service is available 100%. A 
customer might easily verify this by developing a script that checks availability. 
If you do not send honest data, at some point in time customers will notice it, and then the 
community will go crazy. 
Yet, customers and providers recommended that certification authorities should randomly perform 
validation tests on regularly basis to prevent data manipulation or reveal tampered data. As one cloud 
service provider said: “You might validate this on a regularly basis. For example, during yearly spot 
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checks”. Further, a cloud service customer said: “Apart from that you will trust the provider that he is 
sending the true values”. 
6.2 Implications 
To counteract current shortcomings of test-based CSC and enable monitoring-based CSC, we applied a 
design science approach and derived universal meta-requirements and design guidelines for CSC 
monitoring systems. Our findings reveal that CSC monitoring systems have to fulfill various requirements, 
such as transmitting monitoring information in an aggregated and confidential way. To address these 
requirements, we show what design CSC monitoring systems should follow by, for example, integrating 
existing IT infrastructure monitoring systems and corresponding plugins and applying research findings 
from the related continuous-monitoring and -auditing domain.  
We contribute to practice and research in several ways. While prior research has proven the feasibility of 
monitoring-based CSC by developing a prototype (Krotsiani et al., 2015) and providing recommendations 
on what to monitor (Stephanow & Fallenbeck, 2015), we conduct the first work that identifies meta-
requirements for designing a CSC monitoring system based on exhaustive discussions with industry 
experts. Thereby, we have expanded the current knowledge base regarding CSC in general and 
monitoring-based CSC in particular. Thoroughly defined requirements are important in design science 
research because they ensure an IT artifact’s relevance to a real-world problem and provide the basis for 
creating and evaluating an IT artifact (Beck et al., 2013; Hevner et al., 2004; Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 
2008; Walls et al., 1992). Without clearly defined requirements, the IT artifact will not be useful and cannot 
offer a satisfying solution (Albert et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2013; Markus et al., 2002). Furthermore, we 
derive several design guidelines to address meta-requirements. Researchers can use these guidelines to 
implement an IT artifact and evaluate proposed concepts. Hence, our derived design guidelines contribute 
to the development of CSC monitoring systems and enable monitoring-based CSC that overcomes issues 
of prior test-based approaches. 
As we grounded the CSC monitoring system’s design in justificatory knowledge, we have not only 
increased the extent to which designers understand the problem domain (Arazy et al., 2010) and 
explained why a CSC monitoring system takes the form that it does and why it works (Gregor & Jones, 
2007) but also formulated high-level design guidelines independent of technological constraints and 
specific implementation details (Arazy et al., 2010). Consequently, in regard to artifact mutability (Gregor 
& Jones, 2007), our derived meta-requirements and design guidelines apply to both cloud service 
contexts and to continuous assessments of IT infrastructures in related contexts. For instance, although 
we discuss certification criteria that certification authorities should continuously audit in a cloud service 
context, requirements and corresponding guidelines for aggregating, securing, filtering, and providing 
certification-relevant data also apply to related IT assessments domains.  
For practice, we provide grounding for developing systems that enable monitoring-based CSC and, 
thereby, provide a way to overcome practical issues with test-based CSC that prior research has focused 
on (e.g., Kunz & Stephanow, 2017; Stephanow & Khajehmoogahi, 2017; Wang et al., 2014). In particular, 
our design guidelines show how one can leverage existing monitoring technologies by implementing an 
agent-based certification server to enable monitoring-based CSC. One can use our derived meta-
requirements as evaluation framework to assess suitability and readiness of existing monitoring 
technologies in regard to CSC purposes. By providing meta-requirements and design guidelines that 
depict how to design CSC monitoring systems, we hope to encourage cloud service providers and 
certification authorities to participate in CSC processes and, ultimately, create trustworthy certifications 
and cloud services.  
6.3 Limitations 
As with any study, our study has some limitations. First, although we propose meta-requirements and 
design guidelines by following the first two phases in Kuechler and Vaishnavi’s (2008) design science 
approach, we do not develop a CSC monitoring system and, more importantly, evaluate it afterwards. 
With this study, we focus on giving insights into current state and issues of CSC to motive researchers 
and practitioners to engage in these topics. We believe that CSC constitutes one possible way to address 
current gaps and issues in cloud computing. We leave it to future research to develop and evaluate a 
monitoring technology to perform continuous cloud service certification and, thus, complete the first design 
cycle.  
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Second, our study has limitations concerning the number and depth of interviews we conducted to gather 
necessary data. While we conducted five expert focus group interviews with 33 cloud experts and 10 one-
to-one interviews and derived and validated meta-requirements and design guidelines based on those 
interviews, future research might focus on gathering more information on specific findings to increase 
understanding. In addition, we chose a key informant method for data collection and focused on 
informants on a managerial level. This approach, while having advantages for our exploratory work, has 
the limitations that the data reflects perceptions of one person per company. Likewise, interviewees may 
have found it difficult to verbalize some requirements about designing CSC monitoring systems, 
particularly since they had not yet adopted such system. Future research might observe providers and 
authorities interacting with CSC monitoring systems to derive further or refine existing meta-requirements. 
Moreover, we analyzed data based on how we interpreted it. Nevertheless, we confidently believe that we 
reduced potential interpretation bias by constantly validating our interim findings throughout the three 
design cycles. 
The third limitation refers to generalizability. The data-collection methodology we applied had advantages 
for our exploratory work, and the theoretical sampling strategy we followed suggests that we recruited 
highly qualified individuals to participate in the study. Nonetheless, one cannot extrapolate our results to 
other populations (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). Future research should investigate whether and to what 
extent our results generalize to other contexts than cloud computing and other types of certifications, 
particularly mandatory certifications.  
Finally, we provide a set of design guidelines based on related work, interview findings, and knowledge on 
existing monitoring technologies. Designers and researchers may come up with additional design 
guidelines that fulfill meta-requirements. We analyzed only a limited amount of monitoring technologies in 
detail and, thus, might have neglected promising monitoring technologies that already fulfill most of our 
requirements and, thus, that certification authorities could leverage CSC purposes.  
6.4 Future Work 
Future work might implement a prototype system according to derived design guidelines to test our meta-
requirements. Therefore, researchers first need to define a set of testable design propositions to verify 
whether design guidelines satisfy meta-requirements (Walls et al., 1992). One can articulate numerous 
testable design propositions to address the extent to which a guideline satisfies meta-requirements. 
However, in the context of a single study, one can articulate and test only a few propositions (Arazy et al., 
2010; Walls et al., 1992). Table 11 articulates example propositions to guide future work. 
Table 11. Testable Design Propositions 
No. Testable design proposition description 
Design 
guidelines 
Meta- 
requirements 
TDP1 
One can feasibly design a CSC monitoring system that applies an 
agent-based architecture model to gather certification-relevant data 
from different monitoring technologies. 
DG-7 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-DGL2 
REQ-NF1 
REQ-NF2 
TDP2 
One can feasibly design a CSC monitoring system that integrates a 
trusted third-party module to prevent internal log manipulation. 
DG-12 REQ-DL2 
TDP3 
One can feasibly design a CSC monitoring system that implements 
data-masking techniques such as encryption, substitution, and nulling 
out to ensure data confidentiality. 
DG-13 
REQ-DGL4 
REQ-AL2 
REQ-IL2 
TDP4 
One can feasibly design a CSC monitoring system that provides a data 
interface to exchange monitoring data with certification authorities. 
DG-16 REQ-IL1 
Further, future research should evaluate how certification authorities and cloud service providers can 
exchange monitoring data while considering taking security challenges. With this study, we hope to 
encourage further researchers to address these issues and, thereby, create continuously secure and 
reliable cloud services. 
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7 Conclusion 
Given that organizations have begun to increasingly rely on cloud service providers to support their daily 
IT needs, the necessity for continuous, highly reliable, and secure services has increased in importance. 
CSC represents a disruptive change because it provides cloud customers with ongoing, up-to-date 
feedback about a cloud service’s security and privacy levels compared with conventional certifications that 
assess a cloud service only at a specific point in time. Nevertheless, certification authorities and cloud 
service providers continue to struggle with implementing CSC processes and systems due to their high 
complexity and the challenging interplay between both parties. While practitioners have scarcely applied 
test-based methodologies to achieve CSC, monitoring-based CSC strategies represent auspicious means 
because they reuse data that cloud service providers routinely gather while monitoring their cloud service 
infrastructure. However, previous research has mostly focused on achieving and applying test-based 
CSC. Thus, we need to better understand how to design CSC monitoring systems to enable certification 
authorities to use monitoring-based CSC to monitor cloud services. To counteract the current 
shortcomings with test-based CSC and foster the diffusion and application of CSC, we derived universal 
meta-requirements and design guidelines for designing CSC monitoring systems by conducting 
comprehensive interviews with various stakeholders, reviewing related literature, and surveying available 
monitoring technologies. Our findings reveal that CSC monitoring systems must fulfill various 
requirements, such as transmitting and monitoring information in an aggregated and anonymized manner. 
To address these requirements, we show how to properly design CSC monitoring systems (e.g., by 
applying anagent-based system architecture and integrating existing IT infrastructure monitoring systems 
and corresponding plugins). 
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Appendix A: Information on Interviewees 
Table A1 provides information on interviewees participated in the focus group interviews. Table A2 
summarizes information on interviewed cloud customers. 
Table A1. Information about Focus Group Interview Participants 
Area of expertise Position 
Years in 
company 
Participated in 
focus group 
1 2 3 4 5 
Certification authorities representatives 
Cloud service auditing Acting director 6  X X X  
Cloud service auditing Management 3  X X X  
Cloud service auditing Management 2  X X X  
Security analysis & auditing Operational 5  X    
IT-Infrastructure auditing Freelancer 14   X   
ISO 27001 auditing Freelancer unknown   X   
Cloud service auditing Operational 9   X  X 
Data protection and security auditing Management 6   X   
ISO 27001 auditing Management 20     X 
ISO 27001 auditing Operational 5     X 
Data protection and security auditing Freelancer 15     X 
ISO 27001 auditing Management 17     X 
Cloud service providers 
Cloud operation, SaaS, PaaS Management 6 X     
Cloud operation, SaaS Management 5 X     
Cloud management, SaaS Management 6 X     
Cloud management, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS Management 8 X X X   
Cloud management, SaaS CEO 2   X   
Cloud management, PaaS, IaaS CEO 18   X   
Cloud management, IaaS CEO 13   X   
Cloud management, SaaS CEO 2   X   
Managing cloud security services Management 8  X X X  
Cloud management, SaaS Management 11  X    
Cloud management, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS Management 6  X    
Cloud management, SaaS, PaaS Management 17    X  
Cloud management, SaaS, PaaS Management 20    X  
Cloud management, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS Management 15    X  
Cloud operation, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS Operational 7    X  
Cloud management, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS Management 16    X  
Cloud service consultants 
Cloud operation consulting Management 9 X     
Quality management consulting Management 18  X    
Quality management consulting Management 21  X    
Regulations and law consulting Operational 4   X   
Business development consulting Management 7   X   
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Table A2. Information about Interviewed Cloud Service Customers 
ID Position 
Years in 
company 
Cloud 
experience 
Certification 
experience 
Industry 
Company 
size (no. 
employees) 
Company 
cloud 
usage 
Importance of 
certifications 
Interview 
duration 
i01 Consultant 7 High High (ISO) IT 130 SaaS High 40 min 
i02 Head of IT 8 High High (ISO) IT 130 SaaS High 66 min 
i03 Head of IT 21 Low High (ISO) Metal 750 None High 49 min 
i04 
Team 
manger 
5 High High (ISO) IT 130 SaaS High 58 min 
i05 Head of IT 16 Low High (ISO) Health 9000 None High 69 min 
i06 
CTO/ 
Founder 
6 High None IT Software 18 Yes Low 48 min 
i07 
IT-Service 
manager 
4 High High (ISO) Engineering 2500 Yes High 64 min 
i08 Head of IT 10 Low High (ISO) 
Health 
assurance 
300-750 Yes High 46 min 
i09 Head of IT 19 High High (ISO) Finance 700 None High 44 min 
i10 Head of IT 14 Low None Agribusiness 2700 None High 48 min 
 
  
500 Designing Monitoring Systems for Continuous Certification of Cloud Services 
 
Volume 44  10.17705/1CAIS.04425 Paper 25 
 
Appendix B: Example Interview Guidelines 
In this section, we provide an example overview of (translated) questions that we asked practitioners 
during the interviews. 
B1 Focus Group Interviews 
1) CSC use cases 
a) Why should you change from a conventional certification to CSC? 
b) Are there additional stakeholders in the context of CSC compared to conventional 
certification contexts? 
c) How could these stakeholders jointly participate in a CSC process? 
d) Describe example situations how your company can take part in CSC processes. 
2) Certification scope 
a) Which characteristics of a cloud-service are important for you and should be certified 
continuously?  
b) What are upper and lower boundaries of the certification / auditing frequency? 
3) Architectural concepts 
a) Which components and processes are required to perform monitoring-based CSC? 
b) How can certification-relevant data be gathered and exchanged between parties? 
c) Which monitoring systems and tools do you have to monitor security, privacy, and 
reliability issues? 
d) Which monitoring data might be relevant for certification purposes? 
e) How can we leverage existing monitoring technologies for CSC? 
f) How should certification-relevant data be presented or transferred to certification 
authorities? 
4) Risks and limitations 
a) Which risks and challenges bears integrating extern monitoring services or third-party 
services or providing certification-relevant data? 
B2 Customer Interviews 
1) Criteria and certification frequency 
a) Which characteristics of a cloud-service are important for you, and should be certified 
continuously?  
b) How often should these criteria be checked for adherence?  
2) Customer integration 
a) How would you, as a customer, like to be involved in the processes of CSC?  
b) Should the process of CSC be customizable for you (e.g., defining thresholds)?  
c) Which requirements do you have concerning privacy and security of your data during 
CSC processes? 
3) Information transfer to the customer 
a) Which information should be delivered continuously to you? 
b) Through which channels (e.g., e-mail) would you like to receive certification information?  
c) On which events would you like to be notified? 
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Appendix C: Methodological Guidelines for Interviews 
Table C1 summarizes how we followed methodological guidelines from Sarker and Sarker (2009). 
Table C1. Methodological Guidelines with Illustration (Sarker & Sarker, 2009) 
Aspect of the 
study 
Methodological 
considerations 
Additional description Illustration (where applicable) 
Organization 
choice 
Selecting 
suitable 
organizations to 
intensively 
study the 
phenomenon 
We sought to interview 
employees from representative 
organizations about continuous 
cloud service certification. We 
chose organizations based on 
their quality/reputation to derive 
normative implications for future 
practice (Flick, 2014; Patton, 
2015). 
 
We interviewed 16 cloud service providers, twelve 
certification authority representatives, five cloud 
service consultants, and 10 cloud service 
customers. The practitioners who participated in 
our interviews had not adopted CSC when we 
interviewed them but had interest in or strove for 
innovatively developing CSC. We distributed the 
interview partners to gain as many insights as 
possible and triangulate data from different sources 
and perspectives on the phenomenon as Patton 
(2015) recommends. 
Data 
collection 
Choosing 
interviewees 
The acting director of a 
participating certification 
authority invited suitable 
respondents to join the focus 
group interviews. We employed 
“snowballing” techniques to 
acquire additional interviewees 
(Patton, 2015). We acquired 
customer interviewees via 
business-oriented social 
networking services. 
 
Conducting the 
interviews 
Sensitivity to the following 
principles: 
1) flexibility 
2) non-direction, and 
3) range (Flick, 2014). 
1) We followed a semi-structured interview 
approach to foster discussions among participants 
(Myers, 2013). We rescheduled or shortened the 
interview agenda items to suit emerging and highly 
discussed themes. 
2) We strived to maintain an open and nondirective 
style of conversation during the interviews. We 
applied projective techniques to uncover 
participants’ innermost thoughts and feelings 
(Donoghue, 2000). 
3) We varied how we conducted the interviews 
depending on the distribution of interviewees 
concerning their perspectives and interviewees’ 
motivation and ability to elaborate on CSC issues. 
Maintaining 
empathetic 
neutrality 
“Nonjudgmental form of 
listening” (Walsham, 1995); 
empathizing with interviewees’ 
frustrations but simultaneously 
maintaining distance (Patton, 
2015). 
We strived to be patient and sympathetic listeners 
when interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with 
current certification approaches or certification 
authorities without elaborating on organizational 
stories that did not pertain to the CSC contexts. 
Data 
analysis and 
representation 
Triangulation 
“Data triangulation” (Flick, 2014; 
Patton, 2015); comparing 
responses across respondents 
and time as part of the constant 
comparison process (Charmaz, 
2000). 
Whenever possible, we strived to ensure that 
multiple respondents suggested derived 
requirements (at least across different interviews). 
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Table C1. Methodological Guidelines with Illustration (Sarker & Sarker, 2009) 
Being 
suspicious 
about evidence 
 
Sensitivity to possible biases in 
interviews (Klein & Myers, 
1999). 
We ensured that we recognized individuals in 
different positions and situations who may have 
brought different biases to the interview. For 
example, we treated some recommendations from 
a cloud service provider that focused on CSC’s 
economic feasibility with caution. We also sought 
to validate issues that the interviewees raised with 
data from other interviews. 
Member 
checking 
Validating/checking 
researchers’ interpretations with 
interviewees (Flick, 2014). 
We adapted interview guides if new concepts 
emerged and to validate derived requirements. For 
example, we conducted focus group interviews 
between November, 2014, and January, 2017. 
Thus, we had sufficient time to analyze the results 
and adjust future interview guidelines. 
Being sensitive 
to ethical 
concerns 
 
1) Balancing anonymity and 
disclosure (Flick, 2014). 
2) Ensuring that transcripts and 
other data were kept secure 
(Myers & Newman, 2007). 
3) Respecting respondents’ 
knowledge and time (Myers 
& Newman, 2007). 
1) We ensured that we would not disclose the 
following information: organizations’ identity and 
interviewees’ personal information, identities of 
cloud technologies and methodologies, and 
specifics about interviewees’ opinions about CSC. 
2) We ensured that only the authors and 
transcribers had access to the empirical material. 
3) We scheduled meetings to fit the interviewees’ 
schedules and frequently acknowledged their 
efforts. 
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Appendix D: Overview of Meta-requirement and Guideline Refinement 
Design science processes typically occur in multiple iterations, which enables one to generate a design or 
the IT artifact such that it fully satisfies the researchers and practitioners who subsequently use it (Beck et 
al., 2013; Hevner et al., 2004). Thus, the entire design process involved much repetition since, in each 
step, we repeated and improved on previous steps. Building on our iterative data-gathering approach, we 
used the interviews to evaluate our derived meta-requirements and design guidelines (see Table D1 for 
summary).  
Table D1. Overview of Meta-requirement Refinement in Iterative Interview Phases 
Interview 
No. 
Type 
Meta-requirements 
DGL1 DGL2 DGL3 DGL4 AL1 AL2 AL3 DL1 DL2 IL1 IL2 NF1 NF2 NF3 
1 
Req. new new new / new new new / new new new new / new 
Cause / / new / new new / / / new / new / / 
Cons. / / / / / / / / / new / new / / 
2 
Req. ref ref ref / ref / ref new ref ref ref ref new / 
Cause / / / / new / new new / / / ref new / 
Cons. / / / / / / / new new new / new new / 
3 
Req. ref ref / new ref ref / ref ref ref / ref / ref 
Cause new / / new ref / / / / ref / new / / 
Cons. / / / / / / / new ref new / / / / 
4 
Req. ref ref ref ref / ref ref ref ref ref ref ref / ref 
Cause / / / new / ref / ref / / / new / / 
Cons. / / / / / / / / / / / / / new 
5 
Req. ref ref ref / ref ref ref / ref ref ref ref / / 
Cause / / / / / ref / / / / / / / / 
Cons. / / / / / / / / / new / / / / 
6 
Req. ref ref / / / / ref / ref ref ref / / ref 
Cause / / / / / / new / / / / / / / 
Cons. / / / / / / / / / ref / / / / 
Req. = meta-requirement, cause = causes of requirement, cons. = consequence of (non-)adherence to requirement, new = 
requirement / cause / consequence was first identified, ref = additional data lead to refinement, / = no data gathered. 
First, we analyzed the data gathered in the first and second focus group interviews in 2014 to derive a first 
set of meta-requirements and corresponding design guidelines. This set comprised 13 meta-requirements 
and 15 design guidelines. In addition, we identified 15 causes for meta-requirements and eight 
consequences of (non-)adherence to meta-requirements. For example, we derived the meta-requirement 
“enable data aggregation” (REQ-AL1) and developed the corresponding design requirement “perform 
service-focused aggregation by using agent teams” (DG-9), which a CSC monitoring system needs to 
“reduce data complexity” and “prevent false positives” (coded as causes). 
To evaluate our initial findings, we presented and discussed this set with practitioners during the third 
focus group interview in 2015. Afterwards, we refined the meta-requirements and design guidelines 
accordingly and also identified one additional meta-requirement, one design guideline, three causes, and 
two consequences of meta-requirements. For example, we added the new meta-requirement “ensure data 
confidentiality during data gathering” (REQ-DGL4) because cloud service providers expressed concerns 
that one might misuse gathered data to surveil employees and, thus, violate employees’ privacy or 
regulations. 
As a second evaluation, we validated these results during the one-to-one interviews with cloud customers 
in 2015. Based on these interviews, we further refined our previous findings and identified an additional 
three causes and two consequences. For example, we refined the meta-requirement “ensure data 
confidentiality during data gathering” (REQ-DGL4) as interviewed cloud customers expressed their 
concerns about cloud service providers and certification authorities’ monitoring their data. In addition, we 
coded a new cause named “data confidentiality during monitoring cause: customer monitoring”. 
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Finally, in the last evaluation phase, we discussed the design concepts about CSC monitoring systems 
that we derived and jointly assessed on their suitability for performing continuous assessments during our 
focus groups in 2017. We refined our meta-requirements and design guidelines and identified two causes 
and one consequence when analyzing the data from these final focus groups. For example, we revised 
the design guideline “implement attribute-based access control” (DG-14) because focus group participants 
emphasized that certification authorities have different assessment scopes depending on the specific 
certification. Consequently, we extended agent access policies by including environmental conditions that, 
for instance, limit information exchange based on a specific certification and auditing scope to prevent the 
issue that a certification authority can inspect too much evidence. 
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Appendix E: Assessing Monitoring Systems 
During the suggestion phase, we surveyed existing monitoring technologies to better understand 
monitoring systems and to determine what design CSC monitoring systems should adopt. IS theorists 
widely include empirical data alongside the extant literature as a means to raise the overall analysis to a 
higher conceptual level (Beck et al., 2013; Fernandez, 2004; Levina & Vaast, 2005). We searched for 
monitoring systems and tools using the Google and Bing search engines. By applying the search terms 
“monitoring system” and “monitoring tool”, we identified 174 monitoring technologies. We found prominent 
monitoring technologies that the practitioners we interviewed used as well. 
 
 
Figure E1. The Approach We Followed to Assess Existing Monitoring Systems 
We assessed the monitoring technology in three iterations (refer to Figure E1). First, we assessed all 174 
technologies based on different quality criteria, such as the degree of diffusion, community size, 
reputation, age, and maturity. These assessments reduced the relevant technologies by 63 for the next 
iteration. In the second iteration, we carefully analyzed the functionality that each technology provided. As 
a result, we removed 16 technologies because their functions had a limited scope or they constituted 
niche products. In the third iteration, we carefully analyzed and assessed the remaining 47 technologies 
regarding, for example, their architecture, data-collection capabilities, interfaces, and support for 
distributed monitoring. From this last assessment, we chose 17 monitoring systems and 10 monitoring 
tools to more deeply analyze. We assessed the documentation and system specifications of each system 
and deployed some technologies in test environments.  
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Appendix F: Design Guidelines Overview 
Table F1. Guidelines for Designing CSC Monitoring Systems 
ID Design guideline Description 
Corresponding meta-
requirements 
Design guidelines to leverage existing monitoring technologies 
DG-1 
Leveraging IT 
infrastructure-
monitoring systems 
Integrate IT infrastructure monitoring systems as they 
typically monitor applications, services, operating systems, 
system metrics, and network infrastructures. 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-DGL2 
REQ-NF1 
REQ-NF2 DG-2 
Leveraging 
monitoring tools 
Leverage monitoring tools to gain detailed insights about 
cloud service and process operations that surpass the 
capabilities of infrastructure monitoring systems. 
DG-3 
Leveraging 
monitoring plugins 
Leverage monitoring plugins to extend monitoring 
technologies’ capabilities. 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-NF2 
Design guidelines to access external interfaces 
DG-4 
Integrate external 
databases 
Connect to databases that provide valuable information. REQ-DGL1 
DG-5 
Access interfaces of 
subproviders 
Access service interfaces of subproviders to gather 
information about certification adherence that subproviders 
provide. REQ-DGL3 
DG-6 
Monitor services of 
subproviders 
Incorporate means to measure services that subproviders 
provide (e.g., test-based CSC methodologies).  
Guidelines to apply and operate an agent-based architectural model  
DG-7 
Apply an agent-
based architecture 
model 
Dispatch certification agents to different monitoring 
technologies to gather certain certification-relevant data. 
REQ-DGL1 
REQ-DGL2 
REQ-NF1 
REQ-NF2 
DG-8 
Equip agents with 
security policies 
Agents can receive security policies to ensure that they 
comply with data-protection regulations or customer 
requirements. 
REQ-DGL4 
DG-9 
Perform service-
focused 
aggregation by 
using agent teams 
Organize agents as hierarchically structured teams to 
aggregate data across monitoring technologies. 
REQ-AL1 
DG-10 
Store meta-
information about 
agent operations 
Provided meta-information should comprise data on 1) what 
was monitored, 2) how it was monitored, 3) when it was 
monitored, 4) who performed the monitoring, and 5) the 
monitoring results. 
REQ-NF3 
Guidelines to incorporate and secure flexible data storages 
DG-11 
Incorporate flexible 
data storage 
technologies to 
store and archive 
data 
Incorporate flexible data storage technologies to easily 
adjust data schemes and store additional data or results 
from new data analysis operations in, for example, a NoSQL 
document database. 
REQ-DL1 
REQ-NF2 
DG-12 
Implement means 
to guard data 
against improper 
modification 
Integrate a trusted third-party module that provides secure 
log encryption functions, establish a chain of custody for 
digital evidence, or apply other techniques from the cloud 
forensics domain to prevent internal log manipulation. 
REQ-DL2 
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Table F1. Guidelines for Designing CSC Monitoring Systems 
Guidelines for secure data exchange 
DG-13 
Embed data-
masking techniques 
Embed data-masking techniques such as encryption, 
substitution, and nulling out. 
REQ-DGL4 
REQ-AL2 
REQ-IL2 
DG-14 
Implement attribute-
based access 
control and define 
access policies 
Implement an attribute-based access control to filter data 
according to an authority’s needs and privileges. Specify 
access policies that define the access rules for the allowable 
subjects, operations, and environmental conditions to the 
object. 
REQ-AL2 
REQ-AL3 
REQ-IL2 
DG-15 
Implement 
encrypted data-
transmission means 
Provide functionalities to automatically generate reports 
based on analyzed data and automatically transmit 
encrypted reports about defined points in time. REQ-IL1 
REQ-IL2 
DG-16 
Implement secure 
data-providing 
interfaces 
Implement passive interfaces that enable certification 
authorities to access data. 
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Appendix G: Monitoring Plugin Evaluation 
Monitoring technologies prominently feature an extendable architecture, which provides easy integration 
with third-party plugins. Typically, one can write plugins in various programming languages (e.g., Perl, 
bash script, Java, PHP or Python). One can access plugin source code over sharing platforms, and these 
plugins fall under open source license, which allows programmers to modify or adapt them to a particular 
monitoring scenario. Most monitoring systems work with a broad range of plugins from different platforms 
(i.e., Icinga 2, Zabbix and Opsview work with most available plugins for Nagios). In this section, we briefly 
evaluate available plugins at Nagios’ Exchange Platform in their relation to support monitoring-based 
CSC. Available plugins on Nagios’ Exchange platform enable administrators to extend core functionalities, 
to use alternative user interfaces, to integrate new components (e.g., monitoring agents), and so on. Table 
G1 further illustrates example plugins from Nagios’ Exchange Platform that might be useful in the CSC 
context. 
Table G1. Outline of Nagios Plugin and Add-on Examples 
Subcategory 
(no. of plugins) 
Description Example plugin 
Cloud (38) 
Nagios plugins for monitoring a cloud 
infrastructure. 
Nagios check scripts to monitor the cloudstack. 
Network and systems 
management (131) 
Nagios plugins to monitor network and 
systems management software. 
Check the state and bandwidth of specified 
interface of Cisco devices. 
Security (107) 
Nagios plugins for monitoring security 
software. 
Check for the Heartbleed vulnerability. 
System metrics (373) 
Nagios plugins for monitoring different 
types of system metrics (e.g., disk, 
memory, CPU, etc.). 
Check CPU performance statistics. 
Monitoring agents (40) 
Agents that allow Nagios to monitor 
remote systems. 
A cross-platform monitoring agent that runs on 
Windows, Linux/Unix, and Mac OS/X machines. 
Active checks 
(48) 
Add-ons for managing active checks. Check ping time. 
Reactor add-ons (54) 
Various add-ons (conditions, actions, 
etc.) for Nagios Reactor. 
Compare results of the output returned from a 
script to a specified exit code. 
Notifications (69) 
Add-ons for sending notifications via 
mail, phone, etc. 
Extend Nagios with voice, SMS, and push-
notification capabilities. 
APIs (46) 
Nagios access and data export 
interfaces. 
Send status of hosts and services using JSON 
format. 
Frontends (123) 
Alternative interfaces—GUIs and CLIs for 
Nagios. 
Allow external company users to view 
infrastructure status information without giving 
them access to the CGI interface. 
CSC requires gathering certification-relevant data; hence, organizations can select a set of plugins from 
the Nagios Exchange Platform and install them in their Nagios deployment to collect such information. For 
example, using the plugin Nagios Remote Plugin Executor (NRPE) enables cloud service providers to 
monitor remote machine metrics (e.g., disk usage or CPU load) (see Figure G1). A SSL connection 
secures data between monitoring host and remote plugins. Plugins on the remote host can gather 
arbitrary information about the certification. The monitoring system can then evaluate and process this 
information provide it to the certification authority. 
 
Figure G1. Gather Certification-relevant Data Using NRPE (Adapted from Nagios Enterprises, 2016) 
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As another example, cloud service providers can provide certification-relevant data to certification 
authorities by providing extended graphical user interfaces through plugins such as Nagex. The Nagex 
plugin provides a Nagios Web dashboard that enables internal and external stakeholders to view 
infrastructure status information without giving them access to the CGI interface. Furthermore, providers 
can integrate available plugins into a CSC monitoring system to provide data transmission interfaces for 
certification authorities as well. More than 48 plugins currently offer various functionalities to export data 
(e.g., in JSON or XML format) and to use SOAP or RESTful interfaces for exchanging data. Similarly, 
available plugins allow remote agents and applications to submit commands and passive checks on the 
monitoring server. Nonetheless, data interfaces are designed for only internal data communication; thus, 
providers need to further adjust these interfaces so that they can securely and confidentially transmit data 
with third-party authorities. 
  
510 Designing Monitoring Systems for Continuous Certification of Cloud Services 
 
Volume 44  10.17705/1CAIS.04425 Paper 25 
 
About the Authors 
Sebastian Lins is a PhD student at the Research Group Critical Information Infrastructures, Institute of 
Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany. His 
main interests in the field of information systems research are the (continuous) certification of cloud 
services and distributed ledger technology as well as understanding and enhancing the effectiveness of IT 
certifications. 
Stephan Schneider is a postdoctoral researcher at the Research Group Critical Information 
Infrastructures, Institute of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods, Karlsruhe Institute of 
Technology, Germany. His research focuses on strategic decision-making in cloud sourcing projects as 
well as on cloud security and certification of cloud computing infrastructures. 
Jakub Szefer is a professor at the Department of Electrical Engineering, Yale University, CT, USA. His 
research focuses on computer architecture and security related topics, including secure hardware-
software architectures for servers and mobile devices, cloud computing security and many-core 
processor architectures with security features. 
Shafeeq Ibraheem is a student researcher at the Department of Electrical Engineering, Yale University, 
CT, USA. His research focuses on computer architecture and security related topics. 
Ali Sunyaev holds the Research Group Critical Information Infrastructures in the Institute of Applied 
Informatics and Formal Description Methods, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany. His research 
interests include design and management of information systems, cloud computing, health IT and 
information privacy. His work has been published in international journals such as Journal of Information 
Technology, Communications of the ACM, IEEE Software, IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing and 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2019 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of 
all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not 
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on 
the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information 
Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on 
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to 
publish from: AIS Administrative Office, P.O. Box 2712 Atlanta, GA, 30301-2712 Attn: Reprints or via e-
mail from publications@aisnet.org. 
